



## FLORIDA DEPARTMENT *of* STATE

**RON DESANTIS**  
Governor

**CORD BYRD**  
Secretary of State

September 20, 2022

The Honorable Craig Latimer  
Supervisor of Elections, Hillsborough County  
2514 N. Falkenburg Rd.  
Tampa, FL 33619

**RE: Notice of Compliance – County Minimum Security Procedures Review**

Dear Supervisor Latimer:

The Division of Elections' Bureau of Voting Systems Certification has completed its compliance review of the county's minimum security procedures. The review of these procedures pursuant to section 101.015(4), Florida Statutes and Rule 1S-2.015, Florida Administrative Code does not include a legal analysis or a determination of compliance with any other provision of the Election Code. The review is based on the county's most current procedures on file, which show a date(s) of September 9, 2022.

Our review indicates that your county's security procedures are in compliance with rule requirements.

This review is separate and apart from other requirements under law to submit any revisions or updates to the Division no later than 45 days before the early voting period in which the revisions or updates will take effect (see section 101.015(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes). We encourage you to periodically review your county security procedures as technology and office practices evolve.

If you need any guidance or have questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at (850)245-6258.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "E. Lipman".


Eleonor G. Lipman  
Regulatory Specialist

/egl

Enclosure: Security Procedures Checklist

**Checklist for Minimum Security Procedures for Voting Systems**  
**1S-2.015 Section 101.015(4),F.S.**

**Hillsborough County**

Date Received: <u>09/09/2022</u> Start review date: <u>09/19/2022</u> End review date: <u>09/20/2022</u> Reviewed by: <u>Eleonor G. Lipman</u> Signature: <u></u> Date : <u>09/20/2022</u>
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		<i>Requirement Addressed</i>	
REFERENCE #	REQUIREMENT	Yes/No / NA	PAGE #
<b>1. Purpose: This checklist provides the objective evidence of the review</b>			
<b>2. Definitions</b>			
<b>3. Filing of Security Procedures</b>			
	Date this security procedures document was filed with the Division of Elections (DOE)		<b>9/9/2022</b>
	Date of commencement of early voting (EV) for which these revisions will apply		N/A
3(b)	Have these revisions been submitted at least 45 days prior to the EV date?		N/A
3(c)	Are the revisions a result of an emergency situation or other unforeseen circumstance?		N/A
3(c)	If revised for emergency situation/unforeseen occurrence, are reason(s) provided?		N/A
3(c)	Did supervisor of elections (SOE) submit revision to DOE within 5 days that revision to security procedures document was made?		N/A
<b>4. Review of Security Procedures</b>			
1	Do these procedures meet the minimum requirements set forth in this rule?		YES
2	4(a)1 Did DOE complete review within 30 days of the date revisions to the security procedures were received from SOE?		YES
3	4(a)1 Did DOE notify SOE with findings within 5 days after completion of the review?		N/A
4	4(a)2 Does DOE response include specific information regarding items which were found to be incomplete or those which do not otherwise meet provisions of rule?		N/A
5	4(a)2 Did SOE provide required information to bring procedures into compliance within 30 days of the date of DOE review notice?		N/A
6	4(a)2 Did DOE issue a notice of compliance or continued compliance within: either 10 days of receipt of updated information <u>OR</u> 10 days from the end of the 30 day period?		YES
7	4(a)3 Are the procedures temporarily approved because DOE could not complete review within 30-day timeframe?		N/A
8	4(a)3 Has SOE been notified that procedures are temporarily approved because DOE could not complete review within 30-day timeframe?		N/A
9	4(b)1 Is this review being conducted as a biennial (odd year) review, pursuant to Section 101.015(4)(b), F.S.? If "Yes", answer Questions 10-12. If "No", skip to 22.		N/A
10	4(b)1 If review is due to a biennial year requirement, was SOE properly notified that the DOE would begin review based on version certified last by SOE, or the last revision on file, whichever occurred last?		N/A
11	4(b)1 If review is due to a biennial year requirement, and the SOE was not properly notified that the DOE would begin review based on version certified last by SOE, or the last revision on file, whichever occurred last, why didn't the notification take place? Did the notification take place at a later date? WHY WASN'T SOE NOTIFIED?: _____ NOTIFICATION DATE (if applicable): _____		N/A
12	4(b)1 If review is due to a biennial year requirement, was the review conducted during the first quarter (January 1 - March 31)?		N/A
13	4(b)1 If review is due to a biennial year requirement and if it was not done during the first quarter (January 1 - March 31), when was the review conducted and why wasn't it done during the first quarter? REVIEW DATE: _____ WHY?: _____		N/A

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14	4(b)2	If review is due to a biennial year requirement and if the SOE was properly notified that the DOE would begin review based on version certified last by SOE, or the last revision on file, whichever occurred last, did the SOE respond within 15 days of DOE's notice by either recertifying the version on file or by submitting and certifying a revision or replacement	N/A	
15	4(b)3	If review is due to a biennial year requirement, did the DOE complete its review of the procedures no later than 90 days of beginning the review?	N/A	
16		If "YES" to 4(b)3, did the DOE notify the SOE within 5 days of completion as to whether its county security procedures were in compliance with subsection (5)?	N/A	
17		If "NO" to 4(b)3, why wasn't the review completed within 90 days of the begin date? WHY?: _____	N/A	N/A
18	4(b)4	If review is due to a biennial year requirement and if the DOE finds that procedures are incomplete and do not comply with subsection (5), does DOE response include specific information regarding items which were found to be incomplete or those which do not otherwise meet provisions of rule?	N/A	
19	4(b)4	If review is due to a biennial year requirement and if the DOE found that procedures were incomplete and did not comply with subsection (5), did SOE provide required missing/incompliant information no later than 30 days from the date of DOE notice?	N/A	
20	4(b)4	If review is due to a biennial year requirement and if the DOE found that procedures were incomplete and did not comply with subsection (5) and if SOE did not provide required missing/noncompliant information within 30 days from the date of DOE notice, did SOE provide within that same timeframe, a status report and a plan including timeline for completing or bringing the procedures into compliance?	N/A	
21	4(b)4	If review is due to a biennial year requirement and if SOE provided either required information or status report and a plan including timeline for completing or bringing the procedures into compliance, did DOE issue a notice of compliance or continued noncompliance (whichever is applicable) within 10 days from the receipt of the supervisor's	N/A	
22	4(c)	Upon approval of security procedures by the DOE, did the supervisor submit within 15 days of DOE notification of compliance a copy of the approved version of the procedures that has all confidential and exempt information redacted from the procedures, along with the statutory citations for each redaction contained in the document?	N/A	
<b>5. Standards for Security Procedures</b>				
<b>5(a) Staffing and facilities security</b>				
23		Do procedures have a description of the supervisor of elections' organization and physical facilities' security?	YES	2
24		Do procedures address chain of custody procedures and security measures to protect the integrity of the voting systems, election materials, and ballots?	YES	2
<b>5(b) Election Schedule Templates</b>				
25		Do procedures include one or more schedule templates for each type of election [NOTE: Municipal Election schedule template may be included, but is not required]?	YES	44-57
26	5(b)	Does the election schedule template begin at least 90 days prior to each regularly scheduled election and 20 days before the date of a special election?  [NOTE: The supervisor is not required to provide a previously submitted schedule template before an election unless changes have been made since the prior submission]	YES	44-57
27	5(b)	If SOE has revised the election schedule template, was it properly submitted at least 45 days before EV begins (pursuant to #3(b))?	YES	44-57
5(b) The election schedule template shall contain the following:				
28	5(b)1	A list of all tasks necessary to conduct the election	YES	44-57
29	5(b)2	Legal deadline, where applicable, or tentative date each task is to be completed	YES	44-57
<b>5c Ballot preparation procedures must include the following:</b>				
30	5c	Steps necessary to ensure that all ballots contain the proper races, candidates and issues for each ballot variation	YES	9

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31	5c	Steps necessary to ensure successful tabulation of ballots	YES	9
32	5(c)1	Assignment of unique marks or other coding necessary for identifying ballot variations or precincts	YES	9
33	5(c)2	Steps to verify that unique marks or other coding necessary for tabulation are correct	YES	9
34	5(c)3	Description of method used to verify that all ballots and ballot variations are accurately prepared and printed	YES	9
<b>5(d) Filing of election information</b>				
Description of the process for filing a copy of the information used within the election management system to define the tabulation/reporting instructions for each election regardless of filings for prior elections, including the following:				
35	5(d)1	A copy of the election database used to define the election	YES	13-14
36	5(d)2	A DS-DE 132 Form completed by an individual who created the election database and definition IF the individual is not an employee of the SOE	YES	14
<b>5(e) Preparation and configuration of Tabulation system</b>				
5(e)1 Do the procedures relating to the preparation and configuration of the tabulation system include the following:				
37	5(e)1a	Description of tests for 100% of voting system components that will be used in the election, after conclusion of maintenance and programming, including Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) voting devices, early voting devices, precinct voting devices, and absentee voting devices, and the procedures for verification of correctness	YES	6-8
38	5(e)1b	Description of how tabulation systems will be secured	YES	6-7
39	5(e)2	Description of test materials utilized and the voting system tests performed prior to the conduct of the public logic and accuracy tests	YES	6-8
<b>5(f) Public logic and accuracy test</b>				
Description of the following aspects of logic and accuracy testing of all automatic tabulating equipment publicly tested as required by Section 101.5612, F.S.:				
40	5(f)1	Each component of the test performed including the test materials utilized for early voting devices, precinct voting devices, and absentee voting devices	YES	12-13
41	5(f)2	Ballot test decks and pre-audited results	YES	12-13
42	5(f)3	Procedures for sealing, securing, and retaining the programs, ballots, test results, other test materials, and records of proceedings	YES	12-13
<b>5(g) Pre-election steps for voting systems</b>				
Description of the process for sealing & securing the voting devices on Election Day and daily during the early voting period. Description includes:				
43	5(g)1	Process for identifying electronic media type such as memory packs, compact flash cards, PC Cards or PCMCIA cards, and any instrument used to activate a voting machine, including:	YES	3-5, 40-43 (Appendices)
44	5(g)1a	Process to create and maintain an inventory of all electronic media	YES	3-5, 40-43 (Appendices)
45	5(g)1b	Chain of custody process and procedure for identifying, documenting, handling, and tracking electronic media from the point of collection or transfer from their storage location, through election coding, through the election process, to their final post-election disposition and return to storage	YES	3-5, 40-43 (Appendices)
46	5(g)2	Process for establishing/maintaining a secure location for storing the electronic media when not in use, for coding an election, for creating the election media, for transferring and installing the election media into the voting device, and for storing these devices once the election parameters are loaded	YES	3-5, 40-43 (Appendices)
47	5(g)2a	Process to ensure that no election media is left unattended or in an unsecure location once it has been coded for an election. If applicable, coded election media must be immediately loaded into the relevant voting device, logged, and made secure or must be placed in a secure and controlled environment and inventoried	YES	3-5, 40-43 (Appendices)

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48	5(g)2b	Process to ensure that election media is sealed in its relevant voting device or container utilizing one or more uniquely identified tamper-resistant or tamper-evident seals, that there is a combined master tracking log of the voting device, election media, and seal(s), and, if applicable, that election media that are device independent (e.g., voter card encoders) devices are stored in a secure, sealed container and are identified on the master tracking log	YES	3-5, 40-43 (Appendices)
49	5(g)2c	Process for maintaining and tracking custody of voting devices once they are loaded with an election definition, including information regarding the chain of custody, which must specifically provide for identifying, documenting, handling, and tracking of devices from the point of loading to final post-election disposition	YES	3-5, 40-43 (Appendices)
50	5(g)3	Recovery plan to be followed in the event of a security breach of the accountability and chain of custody procedures, as well as the process for ensuring that a security breach was confirmed by more than one individual	YES	4, 18, 23
51	5(g)4	Training plan for relevant election officials, staff, and temporary workers that addresses these security procedures and the relevant work instructions	YES	2
<b>5(h) Ballot distribution</b>				
Information for marksense ballots or paper outputs from a hybrid voting system, including on Election Day and during the early voting period, procedures include the following:				
52	5(h)1	Description of how the number and variations of ballots required by each precinct is determined	YES	11
53	5(h)2	Description of the method for securing the ballots	YES	11
54	5(h)3	Description of the process for distributing the ballots to precincts, to include an accounting of who distributed and who received the ballots, the date, and how they were checked	YES	11
<b>5(i) Distribution of precinct equipment</b>				
55		Information regarding the distribution of precinct equipment	YES	4, 40 (Appendices)
<b>5(j) Election Board Duties</b>				
5(j)1 Description of Election Board duties on Election Day and during the early voting period with regard to marksense ballots or paper outputs from a hybrid voting system, including provisional ballots, including the following:				
56	5(j)1a	Process for verifying that the correct number of precinct ballots were received, and that they are the proper ballots for that precinct	YES	17-18
57	5(j)1b	Process for verifying the operability or readiness of the voting devices	YES	17-19, 24
58	5(j)1c	Process for checking and sealing the ballot box	YES	18-19
59	5(j)1d	Description of how unscanned and spoiled ballots are handled	YES	19-20
60	5(j)1e	Description of how write-in and provisional ballots are handled	YES	28, 25
61	5(j)1f	Accounting for all ballots and paper outputs from a hybrid voting system after the polls close	YES	26-30
5(j)2 Description of Election Board duties on Election Day and during the early voting period with regard to voting devices, including the following:				
62	5(j)2a	Process for verifying the identification numbers, seal numbers, and protective counter numbers, if available, of precinct tabulation and/or voting devices	YES	18, 24
63	5(j)2b	Process for checking the operability or readiness of the voting device	YES	18, 24
64	5(j)2c	Process for verifying that all counters except protective counters are set at zero on each voting device	YES	18, 24
65	5(j)2d	Securing a printed record from each voting device, if applicable	YES	18, 24
66	5(j)2e	Checking the correctness of the ballot	YES	18, 24
67	5(j)2f	Preparing voting devices for voting	YES	18, 24
68	5(j)2g	Verification when other than electronic or other means are used to track a voter during the voting process that the correct number of voter authorization slips were received	YES	24-25
69	5(j)2h	Checking and sealing the voter authorization slips container(s) if voter authorizations slips were used	YES	24-25

**Checklist for Minimum Security Procedures for Voting Systems**  
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70	5(j)2i	Handling write-in ballots	YES	28, 32
71	5(j)2j	Handling voting system malfunctions	YES	25
72	5(j)2k	Process for securing voting machines at the close of the polls (including the close of each early voting day) to prevent further voting	YES	26
73	5(j)2l	Process for accounting for voter authorization slips received, if applicable	YES	20, 22
74	5(j)2m	Process for recording and verifying votes cast	YES	27-30
<b>5(k) Transport of ballots and/or election materials</b>				
Description of the process used for transport of ballots and/or election media, to include the steps ensuring a complete written record of the chain of custody of ballots, paper outputs from a hybrid voting system, and election materials on Election Day and during the early voting period, including the following:				
75	5(k)1	Description of the method and equipment used to transport all ballots, paper outputs from a hybrid voting system, and/or election materials	YES	15-16, 40-43
76	5(k)2	Method of recording names of the individuals transporting ballots and/or election materials from one site to another and the time they left the sending site	YES	15-16, 40-43
77	5(k)3	Method of recording the time individuals transporting ballots, paper outputs from a hybrid voting system, and/or election materials arrived at the receiving site and name of individual at the receiving site who accepted ballots, paper outputs from a hybrid voting system, and/or election materials	YES	15-16, 40-43
5(k)4 Description of process used create and maintain a secure location for storing and transporting voting devices once the election definitions are loaded, including procedures to be used at locations outside the direct control of the SOE, such as overnight storage at a polling location or early voting site, including the following:				
78	5(k)4a	Process for creating and maintaining an inventory of voting devices for each storage location, for each election	YES	15-16, 40-43
79	5(k)4b	Description of the chain of custody process for identifying, documenting, handling, and tracking of voting devices from the point of storage to transfer to final disposition or when the voting devices have been left unattended for any length of time, including information about verifying the integrity of tamper-resistant or tamper-evident seals	YES	15-16, 40-43
80	5(k)5	Recovery plan to be followed in the event of a security breach of the accountability and chain of custody procedures. Plan includes a process for dealing with inadvertent damage to seals or accountability/chain of custody documentation errors and a process for ensuring that a security breach, documentation errors, or seal damage are to be confirmed by more than one individual	YES	4, 18, 23
81	5(k)6	Training plan for relevant election officials, staff, and temporary workers that addresses these security procedures and the relevant work instructions	YES	2
<b>5(l) Receiving and preparing voted ballots</b>				
Description of the process of receiving and preparing paper outputs from a hybrid voting system and voted ballots, including provisional ballots, election data and memory devices to include the following:				
82	5(l)1	Description of the process used to verify that all ballot containers are properly secured and accounted for and that the seal numbers are correct	YES	36
83	5(l)2	Description of the process used to verify/reconcile that ballot container(s) for each precinct contain paper outputs from a hybrid voting system, unused ballots, and voted ballots, including provisional ballots, unscanned ballots, spoiled ballots, and write-in ballots as shown to exist on the forms completed by each election board for that purpose	YES	36
84	5(l)3	Description of the process used to inspect marksense ballots or paper outputs from a hybrid voting system to identify those that must be duplicated or upon which voter intent is unclear, thus requiring a determination by the Canvassing Board, including the process for keeping a record of which marksense ballots or paper outputs from a hybrid voting system are submitted to the Canvassing Board and the disposition of those marksense ballots or paper	YES	36

**Checklist for Minimum Security Procedures for Voting Systems**  
**1S-2.015 Section 101.015(4),F.S.**

85	5(l)4	Description of the process for duplicating and recording the voted marksense ballots or paper outputs from a hybrid voting system which are damaged or defective	YES	22, 29, 33-36
<b>5(m) Tabulation of vote</b>				
5(m)1 Description for each step of the ballot tabulation process on Election Day and daily during the early voting period, including the following:				
86	5(m)1a	Counting and reconciliation of voted marksense ballots or paper outputs from a hybrid voting system	YES	29-30
87	5(m)1b	Processing, tabulation and accumulation of voted ballots and election data	YES	29-30
88	5(m)1c	Processing and recording of all write-in and provisional ballots	YES	28-29
89	5(m)1d	Process for handling unreadable ballots	YES	29
90	5(m)1e	Description of backup and recovery of tabulated results and voting system programs	YES	29
91	5(m)1f	Procedure for public viewing of the accumulation process and access to results	YES	29-30
92	5(m)2	Description of each step of ballot tabulation during the early voting period	YES	17, 29-30
5(m)3 Description of each step of the ballot tabulation process in the precincts on Election Day, including the following:				
93	5(m)3a	Printing of precinct results and results from individual tabulating devices	YES	28
94	5(m)3b	Processing and recording of write-in votes	YES	28, 32
95	5(m)3c	Endorsing the precinct results by the Election Board	YES	29
96	5(m)3d	Posting a copy of precinct results	YES	29
97	5(m)3e	Transport of precinct results to central or regional site	YES	29
98	5(m)3f	Consolidation of precinct and provisional ballot results	YES	29
99	5(m)3g	Process for public viewing of the accumulation process and access to results	YES	29
100	5(m)4	Procedure for resolving discrepancies between the counted ballots and voted ballots and any other discrepancies found during the accumulation process	YES	29-30
<b>5(n) Electronic access to voting systems</b>				
Identification of all methods of electronic access to the vote tabulation system, including on Election Day and daily during the early voting period, as well a the procedures for authorizing electronic access and specific functions, and specifying methods for detecting, controlling and reporting access to the vote tabulation system, also including the following:				
101	5(n)1	Procedure to ensure that default or vendor supplied passwords, encryption keys, or other identifiers have been changed and the following:	YES	6-7
102	5(n)1a	Access control keys/passwords are maintained in a secured and controlled environment and individual(s) with access to these items have been delineated	YES	6-7
103	5(n)1b	Discretionary authority to grant individuals the access to change encryption keys and passwords has not been delegated to anyone other than the SOE	YES	6-7
104	5(n)1c	Method for maintaining 'user control' access within the election management system and/or equipment. (i.e. where applicable, an individual's access is limited to certain menus, software modules, or other component of the voting system)	YES	6-7
105	5(n)2	Process for governing access to any device, election media, or election management system with a requirement to use an encryption key	YES	6-7
106	5(n)3	Training plan for relevant election officials, staff, and temporary workers that addresses these security procedures and the relevant work instructions	YES	6
<b>5(o) Absentee ballot handling</b>				
Description of the process for absentee ballot handling to include the following:				
107	5(o)1	Process for determining and verifying absentee ballot variations	YES	31-32
108	5(o)2	Process to assure voters are issued the proper absentee ballot	YES	31-32
109	5(o)3	Process for receipt of absentee ballots by mail or other methods permitted by law and security measures in place to ensure safekeeping and timely receipt by the SOE	YES	32-33
110	5(o)4	Process for precluding voters from voting at the polls and casting an absentee ballot	YES	31-32

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111	5(o)5	Process for opening valid absentee ballots in preparation for tabulation	YES	31-35
112	5(o)6	Process for recording the receipt of all absentee ballots, including regular absentee ballots, State write-in ballots, and Federal write-in ballots, and process for determining which ones should be counted if more than one per voter is received	YES	31-35
113	5(o)7	Description of the security measures for transporting, collecting, and storing blank and voted absentee ballots and related materials prior to and after an election, including but not limited to physical security, chain of custody, secured access, and monitoring	YES	31-35
<b>5(p) Ballot Security</b>				
114		Description of ballot accountability & security measures, beginning with their receipt from a printer or manufacturer until such time as they are destroyed, including physical security procedures employed on Election Day & during the early voting period & identities of all individuals who have authorized access and individuals who have the authority to permit access	YES	39
<b>5(q) Voting system maintenance and storage</b>				
115	5(q)1	Description of maintenance and testing performed on all components of the system to assure that it is in proper working order and is within manufacturer's operating specifications including on Election Day and during the early voting period. Procedures shall also describe storage and nonoperational maintenance of all voting devices.	YES	3-4
116	5(q)1	Description of storage and nonoperational maintenance of all voting devices.	YES	3-4
117	5(q)2	Description of the process used to update anti-virus software installed on the election management system, including the timeframe and method for updating the software NOTE: If a system does not have anti-virus software, disregard this item as it is not a requirement.	YES	5
<b>5(r) Post-election audit</b>				
The security procedures shall include, at a minimum, the following:				
118	5(r)1	Description of the method for the random selection of the races and precincts for a manual audit or automated independent audit, or both	YES	37-38
119	5(r)2	Description of the method for the random selection in the event that municipal or other local elections are held on the same day (as Election Day) and the Canvassing Board certifies the elections, if applicable	YES	37-38
120	5(r)3	Description of the method to determine the ballot count, segregated by ballot type, of the random selection	YES	37-38
121	5(r)4	Description of the method used to ensure the public does not interfere or otherwise disturb the audit	YES	37-38
122	5(r)5	Description of the method for determining the security of ballots, paper outputs from a hybrid voting system, chain of custody controls, protocols for authorized access, and secure storage of ballots and paper outputs from a hybrid voting system, that may be used in an audit	YES	37-38
<b>6. FORM DS-DE 132</b>		DS-DE 132 information is shown in 5(d)2		



*Craig Latimer*  
**Supervisor of Elections**

Our Vision: To be the best place in America to vote

# SECURITY PROCEDURES

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PER SEC.101.015,  
F.S. AND  
RULE 1S-2.015

**Revised and Redacted per  
119.0725 F.S.**

September 8, 2022

**SNOWLETT  
SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS**

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## Section 1: Staffing, training, and facilities security

1. Supervisor of Elections' organization and physical facility security.
2. Training plan pertaining to physical facility.

The Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections (SOE) office is organized into multiple departments: Operations and Support Services; Poll Worker Services and Training; Voter Services; Administration and Finance; Information Technology; and Communications. Senior leadership consists of the SOE plus the Chief of Staff, Chief Legal Counsel, Chief Communications Officer, departmental directors, and deputy directors. The senior leadership team is responsible for establishing and overseeing policies, procedures and processes as well as ensuring regulatory compliance in each of their areas.

The HCSOE has two permanent locations. The downtown location is in the County Center and houses Executive, Administration, Communications (including Candidate Services), and a unit of Voter Services. The Elections Service Center (ESC) is in the geographic center of the county and houses Operations and Support Services, Poll Worker Services and Training, Information Technology, and a unit of Voter Services. Two warehouses at the ESC contain all voting equipment and materials for Election Day and Early Voting. Vote By Mail equipment (e.g., Blue Crest Relia-Vote) is located at the main ESC warehouse. HCSOE facilities comply with fire, safety and Americans with Disabilities Act requirements as well as the safety requirements of Hillsborough County government. HCSOE abides by the standards set by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Security of offices and warehouses is of primary concern and all have key-swipe access. The HCSOE has a contract with a security company to monitor usage and respond to alarms at entry points to agency facilities. CCTV Video Security cameras are located throughout the HCSOE facilities, covering entry and exit points, as well as all areas where ballots are stored or processed.

At the request of the SOE, a Security and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) review was conducted by the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, and an initial report was issued in June 2013. The report identified organized, mechanical and natural controls to enhance safety and security of property and personnel. All recommendations were implemented. A subsequent five-year CPTED review was conducted in 2018, and all recommendations were

implemented. A third five-year review will be conducted in 2023. A Department of Homeland Security Physical Security Assessment was conducted in 2018 and pertinent standards were met. Subsequent physical security assessments have been conducted and standards met.

A Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) is reviewed and updated at least annually. The COOP contains plans and instructions for relocation of operations to a backup site in the event HCSOE locations become inoperable.

Prior to every election cycle, the following occurs: an audit of authorized personnel who have access to the facilities; reexamination of physical access policies throughout the facilities; review of policies and procedures for intrusion incident response; review of positioning and functioning of surveillance cameras; and review of surveillance system management alert policies.

Training on these policies and procedures occurs prior to each election cycle for staff, Canvassing Board members, visitors and others as appropriate.

Canvassing Board members receive a copy of the Security Procedures, with an overview presented by the Supervisor of Elections and key staff, to assure their familiarity with security procedures, to answer questions and to address concerns. As applicable to their positions and duties, staff review policies, procedures, forms and documentation prior to each election cycle. All new staff undergo orientation sessions that provide an overview of the entire organization and each department's roles and functions, as well as intensive training within their assigned department. Seasoned staff members work as mentors to new staff to assure understanding of and compliance with security and other procedures. Temporary workers receive up to a week of paid training. The training consists of review of policies and procedures, and hands on exercises to become familiar with equipment and paperwork. After each election cycle, policies and procedures are reviewed and amended as determined appropriate to address issues or improve processes. Based on such changes, training is amended each cycle as needed.

## Section 2: Pre-election

### Voting system maintenance and storage

- a. Maintenance and testing performed on all voting system components.
- b. Storage and nonoperational maintenance of all voting system components.
- c. How all components of the voting system will be secured.
- d. Chain of custody process for components of the voting system sent offsite
- e. Certified antivirus software installed on election management system's computing equipment.

Annual preventive maintenance is performed on all voting system components on-site by the vendor.

All DS200 ballot scanners, DS850 high speed scanners, and ExpressVote Units are stored in secured environments (continuous CCTV surveillance, restricted access), charged, repaired and cleaned to the manufacturer's recommendations. All repairs and maintenance are performed by the vendor.

All voting systems batteries, voltage, charging, and storage requirements are reviewed annually to ensure compliance with the manufacturer's specifications.

No components of the voting system are sent offsite to vendors for repairs or maintenance. All maintenance and repairs are done on-site under the supervision of SOE staff. A log is maintained to document all repairs performed on any voting system component.

All areas in which components of the voting system are stored are under CCTV surveillance and are accessible via restricted key card access limited to authorized personnel.

Memory sticks used during an election remain locked in the Tabulation Room or Vault at the Elections Service

Center until the memory sticks are loaded and secured in the DS200 ballot scanners or ExpressVote Units. Only authorized election personnel may enter these rooms. Blank memory sticks are stored in a locked cabinet in the Tabulation Room or Vault at the Elections Service Center.

The data servers are tested prior to each election and before each Logic and Accuracy Test. All computer files are backed up to an external hard drive. The Election Database System is checked in a pre-Logic and Accuracy Testing before each election. The Election Database System is locked in the Tabulation Room with access only by the Director of Information Technology and authorized staff.

The antivirus software



## Voting system devices, elections storage media, maintenance, and storage

- a. Sealing and securing all voting devices on Election Day and each day of the early voting period.
- b. Create and maintain an inventory of all elections storage media.
- c. Chain of custody process for elections storage media.
- d. Ensuring any elections storage media prepared for an election is free of malicious software.
- e. Maintaining a secure location for elections storage media.
- f. Distributing voting system equipment to the precincts.
- g. Ensure elections storage media is sealed utilizing uniquely identified tamper-resistant or tamper-evident seals.
- h. Chain of custody process for identifying, documenting, handling, and tracking voting devices.
- i. Recovery plan in the event of a security breach of accountability and chain of custody procedures.
- j. Training plan pertaining all relevant election officials, staff, and temporary workers.

A custody assignment sheet is prepared by the warehouse manager for each precinct and/or Early Voting site. Each precinct/polling location is assigned a DS200 tabulator and an ExpressVote, both of which contain a memory stick programmed for the specific election being conducted. Precincts/polling locations and Early Voting sites may be assigned more than one DS200 and/or ExpressVote unit based on the number of ballot styles or anticipated voter turnout.

When not in use, DS200 and ExpressVote units are stored at the warehouses of the ESC. This facility has controlled access with high-security magnetic lock/card swipe access, CCTV Video Security, and a monitored alarm system. Access to the facility is limited to the SOE and authorized personnel.

In preparation for an election, a memory stick is assigned to each DS200 and a memory stick to each ExpressVote unit. IT staff program and label all election media for each DS200 and ExpressVote. Warehouse staff install and test all equipment.

The memory sticks for both the DS200 and ExpressVote are secured into the units. The DS200 (lid) units are locked and sealed. The seal numbers are recorded on the Opening Verification Form. These seal numbers are verified by the Clerk and Assistant Clerk at the polling site. The tabulator casing is secured.

Warehouse staff print and IT staff retain Configuration and Zero Reports from each DS200 tabulator showing the units have no votes and are ready for the election with date/time and election data verified. When the preparation of the DS200 tabulator is complete, and

the unit is ready for the election, the unit is secured with tamper evident seals and the seal numbers are recorded on the Opening Verification Form. The ESC warehouse manager verifies the seal number.

DS200 tabulators and ExpressVote units are prepared by precinct/polling location and in delivery route order to await distribution.

Delivery personnel are given a delivery sheet to record delivery of each polling location's or Early Voting site's supplies and equipment. Upon delivery, delivery personnel enter the date and time of delivery on the sheet and initial the form. The delivery sheet is returned to the ESC warehouse manager.

If, at any point during pre-election preparation, security, testing or distribution procedures, there is evidence of damage or tampering with a DS200 tabulator or ExpressVote unit, the unit in question is taken out of service and the SOE office notified immediately.

Inadvertent damage to seals during transport of equipment is noted on the appropriate form and reported to the SOE office by phone upon discovery. A seal damaged during transport is replaced with a new seal and verified by transportation crew members. The new seal number is noted on the custody sheet.

If the incident is determined to be deliberate, the Canvassing Board, law enforcement, and the Division of Elections are notified immediately. Any breach of security is included in the Conduct of Election report.

All electronic media undergo full reformatting prior to use.

After the Logic and Accuracy Test has been completed, the DS200 transport case is locked and sealed with a tamper-evident numbered seal. The DS200 serial number and the seal number are recorded on the Opening Verification Form. The electronic poll books are tested for proper operation and assignment to precincts/polling locations. The ExpressVote Units are tested for proper operation after the ballot definition has been loaded.

The SOE rents moving trucks to deliver equipment and supplies to individual precincts, or contracts with a commercial moving service. SOE staff members coordinate delivery of precinct/polling location equipment and supplies. SOE staff and delivery crews load and deliver precinct/polling location equipment and supplies. Delivery personnel record the date and time of delivery to each precinct/polling location on the delivery sheet and return this document to the ESC warehouse manager after the delivery route is completed. Route assignments are based on delivery truck capacity to ensure the most efficient distribution schedule.

SOE staff members coordinate delivery of Early Voting site equipment and supplies. SOE staff and delivery

crews load and deliver Early Voting equipment and supplies to all Early Voting sites. Delivery personnel record the date and time of delivery to each Early Voting site on the delivery sheet and return this document to the ESC warehouse manager after the delivery route is completed. Route assignments are based on delivery truck capacity to ensure the most efficient distribution schedule.

If, during the distribution of the precinct/polling location equipment and supplies, a seal becomes inadvertently damaged as previously referenced or broken the ESC delivery team notifies the ESC warehouse manager immediately and, with the assistance of one other person on the delivery crew, replaces the seal and notes the change in seal number on the delivery sheet. If the seal on the ballot box is replaced, the seal number is updated in the inventory system database.

The Director of IT maintains an inventory of all elections storage media. Each media device is wiped clean after use in an election and returned to a secured storage container until the next election. Prior to use in a current election, an anti-virus scan is performed to assure the absence of any malicious or otherwise unauthorized software.

## Electronic access to voting system

- a. Methods of electronic access; authorizing access and function; detecting, controlling, and reporting access.
- b. Process to ensure SOE's authority to grant authority to change encryption keys and passwords not delegated.
- c. Process to ensure passwords, encryption keys, or other identifiers have been changed as appropriate.
- d. Control keys/passwords maintained in secure, controlled environment; individuals with access delineated.
- e. Maintain 'user control' access so individual's access limited to certain menus, software modules, components.
- f. Verify that all elections storage media used on the voting system is free of malicious software.
- g. Training plan for electronic access to the voting system for election officials, staff, and temporary workers.

The Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections uses a stand-alone election reporting system that functions in one location – Elections Service Center (ESC) at 2514 N. Falkenburg Rd., Tampa, FL 33619.

The reporting system is located in the tabulation room. Physical access to the tabulation room is restricted via high-security magnetic swipe card access. The entire area is under continuous CCTV video surveillance.

The principle of least privilege is used to limit users' access rights only to the menus, modules and components strictly required to their jobs.

Access to the election reporting system software requires logon username and passwords. The SOE is responsible for establishing and maintaining system access rights and passwords. This authority is not delegated.

Electronic access to the voting system is granted by the SOE to the three persons: Director of IT, Chief of Staff, and an on-site vendor support liaison. Prior to each election cycle the usernames and passwords of authorized persons are changed. A copy of this information is provided to the SOE who then secures this in a lock box to which only he has access.

Prior to each election cycle, training is provided to officials, staff and temporary workers to comply with the procedures for electronic access to voting systems. Senior staff in the Information Technology Department provide the training, which consists of review of policies, procedures, forms and documentation.

All electronic media undergo full reformatting prior to use, including anti-virus scanning.

The HCSOE Ballot Tabulation Network is controlled by a series of personal computers, operating in a secure local area network. The tabulation center at the ESC contains some common system elements.

These are defined as follows:

**File Server:** The file server is the central depository for storage of files. All network communications are controlled by the server, which is also responsible for user level password security.

**Administrator Stations:** These PCs administer the ElectionWare and ERM systems, collecting and consolidating all tabulation totals. It is also the source of election reports.

**Reader Station:** These computers interface directly between the USB memory stick readers and the ERM database server. They run the ElectionWare Suite programs which collect the totals from the Memory Sticks from the precinct/polling location scanners and central count scanners and process them into the Central Tabulation System.

**Data Server (Results Acquisition):** This server, located at the Elections Service Center, receives the electronic results from DS200s, which are located at the precincts/polling locations. This process uses a check sum validation to ensure that only precincts that are used in the election are accepted. There is also error checking deployed to ensure that good data is received.

**Firewall:** [REDACTED] firewall is in place between the data server and Central Tabulation Network to ensure only the results data from the server is passed into the Central Tabulation Network.

Website: The Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections maintains a website where election night results are available and updated periodically.

If the Administrator Station fails, it is replaced with one of the PCs being used as a Reader Station or a compatible backup PC. The failed PC is removed from the tabulation network, and the Reader Station is restarted as the Administrator Station. At this point, normal ballot processing can resume.

There are two central file servers. After the Logic and Accuracy Test, a backup of the database and related data is copied from one file server to the other. In the

event of a file server failure, the other server would be brought online and connected to the network. The workstations would have to attach to the new server and staff would continue to process incoming data.

In the event a data server fails a mirrored backup station is turned on and made the production station.

In the event a Firewall fails a mirrored backup of the unit is turned on and made the production Firewall.

In the event the website goes down, election night results will be shared via paper report in the public media room.

## Pre-election steps for voting systems

- a. Voting system components tested and functioning accurately after annual maintenance and programming.
- b. Test materials utilized and the voting system tests performed prior to the public logic and accuracy testing.

After the annual maintenance of voting system components and programming for the election is completed, and once the ballot is determined to be accurate, all of the voting system components that will be used in the election are tested using a pre-marked test deck which includes hand marked and ExpressVote ballots.

The test deck is designed to record a predetermined number of valid votes for each candidate and on each measure and to include for each office one or more ballots which have activated voting positions in excess of the number allowed by law in order to test the ability of the tabulating devices to reject such votes.

A complete backup is performed on the Central Tabulation System (ES&S ElectionWare), which will be used in the tabulation process as follows:

- ✓ After the ballot definition has been verified and the tabulation system has been programmed, a backup is performed by using the instructions provided by the Director of Information Technology.
- ✓ A complete internal Pre-Election Logic and Accuracy Test is performed by reading at least one memory stick from each ballot style into the ERM (Election Reporting Manager). This test involves processing a memory stick from at least one DS200 ballot scanner for each ballot style that was test

voted using a test deck of ballots. Memory stick processing is performed on the ERM workstation that will be used in the election.

- ✓ When completed, the test results are audited by a proofing team. Proofing materials contain various documentation and formulas needed for checking the test data. All items on the test result reports are proofed for accuracy. These checks may include but are not limited to numeric accuracy of results, proper wording and spelling, statistical calculations (registration totals, percentages, under/over votes), and district/precinct cross-references to check the validity of the voting options.

If errors are detected during this process, appropriate corrections are made, and the entire test is re-executed. Once the proofing team has established that the test results are completely accurate, they sign off on the proofed copies of the tests, as well as their auditing checklists. These documents are then stored with the remainder of the election testing materials and are available for inspection during the Logic and Accuracy Tests.

All electronic media is stored in the locked tabulation room and when in use in the DS200 and ExpressVote, the media is in a locked compartment.

## Ballot preparation procedures

- a. Verify that all ballots contain the proper races, candidates, and issues for each ballot variation.
- b. Verify accuracy of assignment of unique marks or other coding used to identify ballot variations or precincts.
- c. Verify that all ballots and ballot variations are accurately prepared and printed.
- d. Verify proper tabulation of the unique marks or other coding used to identify ballot variations or precincts.

For each election, a list of offices to be filled by election is prepared. This list is verified at the beginning of candidate qualifying. As candidates establish campaign accounts locally and with the State of Florida Division of Elections, their names are listed under the office for which they have filed. At 12:00 noon on the last day of official qualification and write-in qualification, SOE staff prepares a certified list of office titles, candidates and issues to be placed on the ballot. The loyalty oaths are used to confirm the spelling of the local candidates' names as they should appear on the ballot and verified. The State of Florida Division of Elections provides the certified list of names for candidates who are required to file with the State of Florida Division of Elections.

The ES&S ElectionWare Suite is the system used to facilitate ballot preparation.

When the issues and names of candidates are entered into the Central Tabulation System, the Central Tabulation System determines and assigns ballot styles based on the profile information that is maintained in the system. A ballot style list of precincts and districts in each style is printed. This list is proofed against the precinct district list to verify that all eligible precincts are assigned the correct ballot style.

When all ballot information has been entered into the system, sample ballots are printed on standard paper stock and reviewed for accuracy against the original source material. If errors are discovered, information is re-entered and new ballots are printed. This process continues until all information has been verified as correct.

After the ballot design is complete and hard copies of each ballot style on ballot paper stock are obtained, the ballots undergo a final verification process where each ballot is checked for legibility, clarity of layout, spelling errors, inaccuracies in candidate/office assignments, errors in office/ballot style assignments, etc. If errors are discovered, the ballot is corrected and reentered into the verification process. Each ballot is put through the tabulating equipment to check that they can be read. Once the ballots are found to be error free, the printer is authorized to produce the ballots.

All sample ballots used during ballot preparation procedures are prominently marked as ballot proofing material. Once ballot preparation is completed, ballot proofing materials are stored securely in a sealed container in the vault at the ESC.

## Ballot and election materials security—pre-election

- a. Ballot accountability and storage measures, and security measures for ballots and election materials.
- b. Individuals authorized access to ballots and election materials; individuals authorized to permit access.

All ballots are received in the Elections Services Center Warehouse where they are stored under continuous CCTV surveillance in restricted access areas until distribution to Election Day polling places, Early Voting locations, or to voters as Vote By Mail ballot.

**Election Day Ballots:** Election Day ballots are delivered from the ballot printing company to the ESC Warehouse approximately four weeks prior to an election. Quantities of ballots received are verified against quantities ordered. The ballots are inspected and stored in a secure area for distribution to precincts. The custody of the ballots remains with the ESC Warehouse manager until distributed.

**Blank Ballot Stock:** Blank ballot stock is intended for use in the Ballot on Demand system at Early Voting locations and at SOE offices for over-the-counter Vote By Mail ballots. Early Voting is conducted in the offices of the Supervisor of Elections and at other designated Early Voting sites. Early Voting sites use Ballot on

Demand to provide precinct specific ballots to voters. Blank ballot stock is secured in the ESC Warehouse in the EV Cage

**Vote By Mail Ballots:** Approximately two weeks before the statutory deadline to deliver VBM ballots to voters, ballots are received at the ESC from the printer. These ballots are secured in the VBM Cage where they are prepared for delivery using the Blue Crest Relia Vote system.

**Test Deck Ballots:** The test deck ballots are delivered to the ESC Warehouse and received by the Director of Operations. They are stamped in red "TEST DECK" and separated into precinct packets for use in testing. All test deck ballots are retrieved and accounted for when testing is completed and secured in the vault throughout the election.

## Ballot distribution

- a. Number and variations of ballots per precinct determined for Election Day and during the early voting period.
- b. Method for securing and controlling access to ballots.
- c. Process for distributing the physical ballots to precincts.

The Hillsborough County SOE uses historical voter turnout information and anticipated turnout figures to estimate the number of ballots required for an election.

Each precinct is assigned its own ballot style. If there is a split within the precinct, a ballot style is assigned to it. For primary elections, a ballot style is designated for each major party conducting nominating elections and a ballot style is designated for no party affiliation voters.

Ballots for Election Day voting are delivered to the ESC from the vendor, where they are examined to ensure the ballot packaging is intact and stored in a secured restricted area. The ballots are inventoried against the order that was placed and transferred to the respective ballot box. The ballots are stored in the precinct/polling location specific ballot box secured with a numbered seal in a locked warehouse that is protected by a security system and video surveillance system. Access is limited to the SOE and designated staff.

Ballots are delivered under the direction of staff from the Operations and Support Services Department to polling places for Election Day voting in locked ballot boxes secured with numbered seals. Using the Opening Verification Form, the Clerk verifies quantity and ballot style information prior to the opening of the polls on election morning and calls the SOE to report discrepancies.

Early Voting sites use ballot on demand to provide precinct specific ballots to voters. Blank ballot paper for Early Voting sites is secured at the ESC. Access is limited to the SOE and designated staff. The Clerk of each Early Voting site is notified of the time and date that the election supplies, including blank ballot paper, will be delivered. The blank ballot paper is then secured at the respective Early Voting site and custody is assumed by the Early Voting site Clerk and staff.

## Public logic and accuracy test

- a. Explain each test performed, including information about the test materials used for EV, ED and VBM devices.
- b. Information about the ballot test decks and pre-audited results used in testing.
- c. Seal, secure, retain election definition, test ballots, results, other materials; maintain record of proceedings.

Prior to the Public Logic and Accuracy Test, every DS200 unit that will be deployed for use in the election is tested with results documented on an L&A Checklist.

- ✓ Error Code/Message (if applicable)
- ✓ DS200 results uploaded successfully on Central Server

This comprehensive checklist includes:

### Step 1: Verify Correct Information on Configuration Report

- ✓ Current Time and Date
- ✓ Unit Serial Number
- ✓ Time Zone
- ✓ Modem Status
- ✓ Modem Type
- ✓ Modem ID
- ✓ Available Backup Storage
- ✓ Scanner FW
- ✓ Power Management
- ✓ DS200 Firmware
- ✓ Election Name
- ✓ Election Date

### Step 2: Process Test Decks

- ✓ Location number in header of this form, on DS200 lid and screen, on ballot box, and Zero Report all match
- ✓ On Zero Report, all races have zero (0) votes
- ✓ Ballots were processed in all 4 orientations
- ✓ Overvoted and blank ballots rejected on initial scan, then rescanned and accepted
- ✓ Multi-sheet sensor tested and functioning properly, ballots were rejected
- ✓ All test deck ballots were processed and public count matches Test Deck A-Card Total in header
- ✓ Test deck ballots were removed, hand-counted total is: \_\_\_\_, and returned to envelope

### Step 3: Close Poll

- ✓ DS200 public count matches Test Deck A-Card Total in header – Public count total is: \_\_\_\_
- ✓ Results tape match expected/pre-determined results

### Step 4: Modem Results (Verify Tab Room Readiness)

- ✓ DS200 results sent successfully YES or NO (if NO enter error code/message below)

### Step 5: Reset DS200

- ✓ DS200 is reset, Zero Report is printed w/ zero (0) votes for each race, and public count is: \_\_\_\_
- ✓ Configuration Report, Zero Report, Results Report, and 2nd Zero Report, on one tape, is removed
- ✓ New full roll of DS200 paper is installed
- ✓ DS200 is powered off and screen and lid are closed and locked

For each election, a quantity of precinct tabulators equal to five percent (5%) of the number of units to be fielded on Election Day or ten (10) units, whichever is greater, tabulators used for Early Voting, and automatic tabulating equipment used for processing VBM ballots, are publicly tested.

County candidates are provided with written notification of the Public Logic and Accuracy Test at the time of qualifying. Statewide candidates are notified by the Secretary of State to contact the county Supervisor of Elections for Logic and Accuracy scheduling. Written notice is also sent by certified mail at least thirty (30) days prior to the start of Early Voting to each County party chair of each political party and all candidates, other than statewide, whose names appear on the county's ballot and who did not receive notice at the time of qualifying. Public notice of time and place of Logic and Accuracy Testing is given at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to its occurrence in a newspaper of general circulation and is posted on the HCSOE website.

The testing begins with the election parameters loaded into the selected automatic tabulating equipment and a zero report produced by each tabulator tested to demonstrate that the tabulating equipment has no votes recorded for any offices or measures in the election. A test deck of pre-audited ballots is produced to record a predetermined number of valid votes for each candidate and on each measure. The test deck includes one or more ballots for each office with activated voting positions in excess of the number

allowed by law and at least one blank ballot to test the ability of the automatic tabulating equipment to reject such votes. The test deck also included hand-marked ballots and ExpressVote ballots. The test deck is processed through the selected units. Similarly, a test is conducted on the VBM tabulation equipment. Results are collected from each unit tested and a cumulative report is produced for all units to confirm total results. Test totals are then compared to the expected outcome and verified by the Canvassing Board.

Once the Canvassing Board verifies that the Logic and Accuracy Test has been satisfactorily completed, the Canvassing Board signs all printed reports and the results of the tests are recorded in the Canvassing Board minutes. All signed materials, test decks, and reports are stored in a secured area at the ESC following the Logic and Accuracy Test.

Immediately after the completion of the first public Logic and Accuracy Test, the Central Tabulation System

equipment is secured. A copy of the election specific passwords is sealed in an envelope and signed across the flap by the Canvassing Board. The Supervisor of Elections, Chief of Staff and Director of Information Technology are the only persons with access to the password. A backup of the election database, test ballots, reports used in the Public Logic and Accuracy Test and the envelope containing the passwords are stored in a secured area and retained in the custody of the Canvassing Board. A copy of the election database is forwarded to the Division of Elections.

For the central count DS850 scanners, a Logic and Accuracy Test is conducted prior to the first day of canvassing VBM ballots, and after the completion of the official count.

## Filing of election information

- a. File with DOE a copy of the L&A tested election database to be used in an election.
- b. Provide DS-DE 132 completed by individual who created database and definition IF not employee of the SOE.

Once the Canvassing Board verifies that the Logic and Accuracy Test has been satisfactorily completed, the Canvassing Board signs all printed reports and the results of the tests are recorded in the Canvassing Board minutes, in accordance with Chapter 101 Florida Statutes, and Rule 1S-2.015, Florida Administrative Code, the Supervisor of Elections sends by certified mail to the Department of State, Division of Elections (DOE):

- Copy of voting system software
- Copy of administrative database used to define the election

- Copy of all election-specific files generated and used by the system
- Documentation stating the release level of the precinct tabulation equipment and firmware
- Form DS-DE 132 (required if outside party creates election definition)

The system parameters disk is mailed to the DOE the day after the completion of the Logic and Accuracy Test.

## Section 3: Election

### Transport of ballots and/or election materials

- a. Recording date, time, and names of individuals who transported ballots, ExpressVote ballots, and/or election materials to a delivery site.
- b. Recording the date, time, and names of individuals who received the transported ballots, ExpressVote ballots, and/or election materials.
- c. Create and maintain secure location for storing and transporting voting devices once election definitions are loaded, including procedures used at locations outside the direct control of the SOE.
- d. Creating and maintaining an inventory of voting devices, at each storage location, for each election.
- e. Training plan for transport of ballots and/or election materials.

**Election Day ballot custody** is secured and documented continuously from initial receipt of ballots from the printer to records retention storage.

1. Upon receipt from the printer, Election Day ballots are placed in the ESC Warehouse under camera surveillance and restricted swipe card access in the custody of the Director of Operations.
  - ✓ Received from printer (*Documentation: Delivery Receipt*)
  - ✓ Quantities confirmed and quality checked (*Documentation: Order Confirmation*)
  - ✓ Sealed into ballot boxes (*Documentation: Custody Assignment Sheet and Opening Verification Form*)
2. Ballots are delivered to voting locations. Sealed boxes in which the ballots are locked are geotagged, in the custody of election staff couriers.
  - ✓ Delivered to voting locations (*Documentation: Delivery Sheet, Seal Verification and Geolocation Report*)
3. Ballots are at the Polling Location in the Custody of the Clerk
  - ✓ Ballot quantities and styles confirmed (*Documentation: Opening Verification Form*)
  - ✓ Distribution to voter (*Documentation: Epollbook Check-in*)
  - ✓ Ballots placed in sealed and barcoded containers and accounted for when voting ends (*Documentation: Closing Verification Form - Voted, Provisional, Spoiled, Unscanned*)
4. Ballots are delivered to drop sites in geotagged black ballot bags in the custody of the Clerk.
  - ✓ Delivered to Drop Site (*Documentation: Drop Site Log, Seal Verification, and Geolocation Report*)

5. Ballots are transported from the Drop Site to the ESC Warehouse in sealed and geotagged bags in the custody of elections staff couriers
  - ✓ Transported to ESC (*Documentation: Delivery Sheet, Seal Verification, and Geolocation Report*)
6. Ballots are in the ESC Warehouse under camera surveillance, restricted swipe card access in the Custody of the Director of Operations
  - ✓ Received at ESC (*Documentation: Receipt Log, Seal Verification*)
  - ✓ Scanned for inventory, image record, and reconciliation (*Documentation: Clear Audit Scanning Log and Reconciliation Report*)
  - ✓ Ballots In record storage for 22 months (*Documentation: Records Inventory Log*)

Election Day supplies are picked up by Clerks the weekend prior to Election Day at the ESC. The supplies include a Clerk's Briefcase, electronic poll books and accessories, name badges, and the clerk's folder containing forms. Backup precinct registers, unscanned ballot bag, voted provisional ballot bag, spoiled ballot envelope, election results bag, completed forms envelope, and seals are also delivered during Clerk's pickup in the Black Ballot Bag. The Clerk's Briefcase and Black Ballot Bag are stored and maintained in a separate secure area at the ESC for transfer to the Clerk during Clerk's pickup prior to the election. The Clerk maintains custody of the Clerk's Briefcase and Black Ballot Bag until arrival at the precinct/polling location.

**Early Voting ballot custody** is secured and documented continuously from initial receipt to records retention storage.

1. Upon receipt from the printer, Early Voting blank ballot stock is placed in the ESC Warehouse under camera surveillance and restricted swipe card access in the custody of the Director of Operations.
  - ✓ Ballot stock received from the printer (*Documentation: Delivery Receipt*)
  - ✓ Quantities confirmed and quality checked (*Documentation: Order Confirmation*)
  - ✓ Ballot stock assigned for delivery (*Documentation: Custody Assignment Sheet and Opening Verification Form*)
2. Ballot stock delivered to voting locations. The vehicles in which the blank ballot stock is delivered are geotagged.
  - ✓ Delivered to voting locations (*Documentation: Delivery Sheet and Geolocation Report*)
3. Ballot stock is at the Early Voting Site in the Custody of the Early Voting Clerk.
  - ✓ Verification of quantities received (*Documentation: Supplies Receipt Log*)
  - ✓ Ballot printed and distributed to voter (*Documentation: Epollbook Check-in*)
  - ✓ At the end of voting each day, ballots are placed in sealed and barcoded containers (*Documentation: Closing Verification Form - Voted, Provisional, Spoiled, Unscanned*)
4. Ballots are delivered to the ESC in geotagged vehicle daily.
  - ✓ Ballots are retrieved by the courier (*Documentation: Courier Log, Seal Verification, and Geolocation Report*)
5. Ballots are in the ESC Warehouse under camera surveillance, restricted swipe card access in the Custody of the Director of Operations
  - ✓ Transported to ESC (*Documentation: Courier Log, Seal Verification, and Geolocation Report*)
  - ✓ Ballots received at ESC (*Documentation: EV Receipt Log, Seal Verification*)
  - ✓ Scanned for inventory, image record, and reconciliation (*Documentation: Clear Audit Scanning Log and Reconciliation Report*)
  - ✓ Ballots In record storage for 22 months (*Documentation: Records Inventory Log*)

At each point of transfer of custody of ballots and election materials, accompanying documentation is signed by the person relinquishing and the person receiving custody.

Secure locations for storing voting devices are maintained within the elections office using multiple methods, such as CCTV surveillance and restricted swipe card access. Locations not under the direct control of the SOE are secured via locked room and/or polling places to which only SOE staff and polling clerks have keys. Transport security is achieved using chain of custody protocols, numbered and tamper evident seals, locks and geotags.

## Early voting requirements

- a. Ballot accountability, storage measures, security measures for ballots and election materials during EV.
- b. Verify the expected number of EV ballots were received at an early voting site prior to the opening of polls.
- c. Verifying that a voter, choosing to vote at an early voting site, receives the correct ballot.
- d. Verifying ID, seal, and protective counter numbers of voting devices used at early voting sites.
- e. Sealing or verifying the seals on the ballot box(es) used at early voting sites.
- f. Verifying the operability and readiness of voting devices used at early voting sites.
- g. Verifying that all counters except protective counters are set at zero on each voting device used EV sites.
- h. Printing record from each device at EV sites, to ensure no votes on the voting device (i.e., zero tapes).
- i. How unscanned and spoiled ballots are handled at early voting sites.
- j. Accounting for and monitoring VBM ballots deposited at a SBIS at an EV site, and SOE office.
- k. Verification if electronic or voter authorization slips/stubs, used to track voter during the EV voting process.
- l. Handling voting system malfunctions at an EV site.
- m. Securing voting machines at the close of the polls at an EV site, process for the close of each EV day.
- n. Accounting of all ballots and hybrid voting system paper outputs after the polls close at an EV site.
- o. Sealing or verifying seals on the voter authorization slips container(s) if used during EV.
- p. Recording and verifying votes cast (i.e., ballot accounting forms, etc).
- q. Tabulation of votes for EV
  - i. Daily process for counting and reconciliation of voted ballots and ExpressVote outputs during EV.
  - ii. Daily processing, tabulation, and accumulation of voted ballots, ExpressVote outputs, election data during EV.
  - iii. Processing and recording write-in and provisional ballots during EV period.
  - iv. Handling unreadable ballots during EV period.
  - v. Backup and recovery of tabulated results and voting system programs during EV period.
  - vi. Handling the results from each of the EV tabulators.
  - vii. Endorsing EV results by the Election Board.
  - viii. Transport EV results to the SOE central or regional site.
  - ix. Handle provisional ballot results.
  - x. Public viewing of the poll closing process at EV sites.
  - xi. Reconciling discrepancies between unused, tabulated, provisional, unscanned ballots; other discrepancies found during EV accumulation process.

The voting method employed for Early Voting sites uses a Marksense ballot completed by the voter and then inserted into the DS200 tabulator by the voter.

DS200s used for Early Voting retain election totals for all precincts. Election totals from DS200s used for Early Voting are directly uploaded into the election management system as per statute no later than 7:00 PM on the day before Election Day.

Early voting rooms are locked when not in use. Facility keys control access to the facility where the polling room is located and/or the polling room itself. There are two sets of facility keys for each Early Voting Team. The poll worker teams will receive the keys, in a manila envelope, hand-delivered by the delivery driver on the scheduled equipment delivery day. The Clerk and Assistant Clerk from each team will each be responsible for a set of keys. Each night, the Clerk and Assistant Clerk will take home a set of facility keys and a set of

voting equipment keys. Poll workers are instructed that these items must never be left behind overnight.

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Blank ballot stock is delivered to the early voting locations as needed during the course of voting. A chain of custody form accompanies all blank ballot stock, signed by the warehouse manager, courier, and early voting poll worker who receives the blank ballot stock.

All voted ballots are returned to the Elections Service Center after the end of voting each day during the early voting period.

Ballots are in the ESC Warehouse under camera surveillance and in areas with restricted swipe card access in the custody of the Director of Operations and Warehouse Manager.

The chain of custody is as follows:

- ✓ Ballot stock received from the printer – documented by delivery receipt.
- ✓ Quantities confirmed and quality checked – documented against the order confirmation.
- ✓ Ballots assigned for delivery – documented on the Custody Assignment Sheet.
- ✓ Ballots delivered to voting locations – geotagged and documented by the delivery sheet.
- ✓ Quantity received verified — documented on the Opening Verification Form.
- ✓ Ballot distributed to voter – documented by epollbook check in.
- ✓ Ballots (voted, provisional, spoiled, unscanned) accounted for when voting ends – documented on the Closing Verification Form, sealed and barcoded.
- ✓ Ballots retrieved by courier staff and transported to the ESC—geotagged and documented on the Courier Log and Seal Verification.
- ✓ Ballots returned to the ESC—documented by EV Receipt Log and Seal Verification
- ✓ Ballots scanned for inventory, record image and reconciliation—documented by Clear Audit Scanning Log and Reconciliation Report

There are hundreds of different ballot styles for each election, based on the different districts in the county. A “split precinct” is one that requires more than one ballot style.

The ballot style is comprised of five digits. The first three numbers correspond to the voter’s precinct number. The fourth digit is reserved for splits, if one exists for the associated precinct. And in partisan elections, the last number represents the voter’s party affiliation.

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The Clerk and Assistant Clerk verify the seal numbers on the Lid Seal, and Ballot Box Seal, and the DS200 serial number, on the Opening Verification Form. The Clerk and Assistant Clerk sign, certifying the information is true and correct.

If, during this procedure, the Election Board discovers evidence of damage to or tampering with any seal on the DS200 tabulator, the tabulator in question is not put into service and the SOE office is notified immediately.

On the first day of Early Voting, the Clerk and Assistant Clerk follow the opening instructions to turn on and

print the Configuration and Election Zero Report for the DS200 tabulator.

This is a process performed the first day of early voting confirming that all races on the Zero Report have zero vote totals. The Zero Report is a critical document that ensures that no ballots have been cast into the DS200 before the polls open. Poll workers use the First Day Opening Verification Form, located in the Clerk’s Folder, along with a set of voting equipment keys and the flashlight, to:

- ✓ Break the seal securing the Auxiliary bin, use the key to open it, and check to make sure no ballots or debris are inside.
- ✓ Before breaking the seal on the DS200 lid, verify the seal matches the seal number recorded on the DS200 and Election Zero Report Verification section of the First Day Opening Verification Form. Then, using the key, unlock the lock, and lift the latches to open the lid. Verify the serial number on the DS200 matches the serial number preprinted on the First Day Opening Verification Form.

The poll worker will then enter the election code. The Configuration Report will immediately begin to print. The Configuration Report lists storage memory availability, firmware and scanner information that has already been verified by the Elections Office.

The Election Zero Report will print. The poll worker will tear off both reports, leaving the Configuration Report attached to the Election Zero Report. He or she will verify the Election Zero Report against the DS200 Zero Report Sample Ballot found in the Clerk’s Folder to verify that all races appear on the report and each race has zero vote totals. The Clerk and Assistant Clerk must sign the Election Zero Report where indicated.

Both reports (Configuration and Election Zero Reports) are placed inside the DS200 Reports Bag.

The poll worker will finish completing the DS200 and Election Zero Report Verification section of the First Day Opening Verification Form by placing a checkmark, where indicated, to confirm the date, time, and site displayed on the DS200 screen are correct, that all races on the Election Zero Report have zero vote totals, and that the Election Zero Report has been signed by the Clerk and Assistant Clerk. The poll worker will then sign, date and record the time where indicated on the opening form.

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On each subsequent day of early voting, the poll worker will unlock the DS200 lid and display screen and place both in the upright position. Because the DS200 is plugged in, the unit will automatically power on opening to the Enter Election Code Screen.

Each day of Early Voting, the Configuration Report will print. The poll worker will tear the report off and place it inside the DS200 Reports Bag. Similar to the First Day Opening Verification Form, the poll worker completes the Daily Opening Verification Form after the first day, and each day thereafter.

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If the voter has spoiled their ballot or the DS200 Unit has rejected the voter's ballot for various reasons, the voter may request a replacement ballot. In any election, a voter may receive two (2) replacement ballots, for a total of three (3) ballots. A voter may only cast one (1) ballot in any given election. The clerk or assistant clerk will reverse the check in on the electronic pollbook to re-issue a ballot and will write spoiled across the ballot and place the spoiled ballot inside the Spoiled Ballot Envelope.

When voting has ended for the day, the clerk or assistant clerk will retrieve the Spoiled Ballot Envelope, remove and count the spoiled ballots, verify the total counted matches the number indicated in the ePollbook, and record this total in section 1 of the Closing Verification Form. He or she will then return the spoiled ballots to the Spoiled Ballot Envelope and place the envelope in the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag.

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Voters have the option to return their Vote By Mail ballot at any one of the designated Early Voting sites. A sealed and locked Secure Ballot Intake Station (SBIS), with a Blue Ballot Transfer Container located inside of it, will be positioned at each Early Voting site. At least one poll worker is designated to stay by the SBIS at all times. The Clerk at the Early Voting site has keys to unlock the SBIS box. Once the voter deposits their voted ballot into the SBIS Box, the voter's ballot has been cast for the election and the ballot cannot be retrieved. At the end of voting each day, a poll worker will retrieve the SBIS Box, secure it inside the polling room, and call Poll Worker Services to inform the office that the site is closed and that daily closing procedures are underway.

The clerk retrieves the Blue Ballot Transfer Container from within the SBIS, checks to assure that no VBM ballots cast that day are left inside the SBIS, and then closes and seals the container.

The SOE courier will come each evening of Early Voting to retrieve the SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container and replace it with an empty Blue Ballot Transfer Container that will be used the next day.

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The Multi-Purpose Form is a double-sided document that contains five forms on one single sheet of paper that is used to identify an issue or a need a voter may have. The Multi-Purpose Form creates a paper trail of a voter's movement in the voting location. It is one of several SOE documents used in procedures constituting a system of checks and balances. It is the one document allowing us to process a voter's address change, name change, signature update, etc. Poll workers are trained to use extreme care in reviewing the form when it is completed by the voter at the Voter Check-In Table and/or the Voter Assistance Table.

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The DS200 unit has an uninterruptible power supply with an internal battery that is continuously charged, enabling the tabulator to continue counting ballots for a limited time during a power failure. In the unlikely instance there happens to be a power failure, the Clerk must be notified so they can immediately call Poll Worker Services to inform them of the situation. The DS200 unit may accept ballots a little slower than usual; however, as long as it accepts the ballots, the unit is working and votes are being recorded. If the internal battery is depleted, the poll worker is instructed to break the seal and unlock the Auxiliary Bin, and instruct voters to insert their voted ballot inside this bin, continuing to have voters insert their ballots inside the Auxiliary Bin until power is restored. Once power is restored, the Clerk will relock and seal the Auxiliary Bin and follow normal procedures. The Clerk will submit an incident report documenting the power failure and then update the incident report to include the time the power was restored.

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During Early Voting, at the end of each day, when voting has been completed, the Clerk and another poll worker record on the DS200 Unit Log the number of "Ballots Cast" from the DS200 display screen. They then subtract this number from the previous day's total to get the current day's total. That number is recorded on the Closing Verification Form. The Clerk and/or Assistant Clerk count and record on the Daily Closing

Verification Form the number of Early Voting Check-ins, the number of spoiled ballots, the number of unscanned ballots, and the number of voted provisional ballots. The number of Early Voting Check-ins are compared to and reconciled with the ballot count on the DS200 Unit Log or the number recorded on the closing verification form. All ballots are placed in the Black Ballot Bag(s) and secured with a numbered seal for return to the SOE Office. When the SOE representatives pick up the Black Ballot Bag, they sign the Daily Closing Verification Form and take possession of the Black Ballot Bags from the Early Voting site.

The Black Ballot Bags are then transported to the SOE office where seal numbers are verified for custody transfer and the contents of the bags are sorted and stored in the secured Early Voting Cage under video surveillance.

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Daily closing procedures are as follows:

Announce Closing: Outside the entrance to the polling place, the clerk will announce that the polls are now closed according to the time on the cell phone. "The Polls are now closed. Voters currently in line can still cast a ballot; however, no additional voters may enter this line." Once the Clerk makes this announcement, a poll worker will stand behind the last person in line to establish the completion of voting. If a voter attempts to enter the line, the voter is informed that the polls have closed and he or she cannot enter the line. If the voter is confrontational, the Clerk is notified and Poll Worker Services is contacted for additional support. The Clerk is notified if there is a line at the time of closing with the approximate number of voters. The Clerk will then inform Poll Worker Services.

Process Remaining Voters: At the end of the voting day, poll workers allow any voters that were in line at the time of closing to cast their ballot. Voters continue to cast ballots as they would prior to the closing of the poll.

Set Up Public Observation Area: After the final voter has cast their ballot and departed, any public observers who want to observe the closing of the poll may enter the polling room. Chairs are placed along the wall for observers. Poll workers are instructed that all members of the public, including media, candidates, and Poll Watchers are allowed to observe the opening and closing procedures. Observers may not touch any equipment or materials, use cell phones, or otherwise interfere with the opening and closing procedures.

Photography is not permitted during the opening and closing processes.

Remove Unscanned Ballots: Removal of ballots from the DS200 is completed by the clerk and an Election Board member of a different party affiliation, as per the following four steps.

1. Remove the seal on the Auxiliary Bin. Thoroughly check for any ballots deposited inside.
2. Retrieve the Unscanned Ballot Bag from the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag. Enclose unscanned ballot(s) inside the blue Unscanned Ballot Bag.
3. Write the total number of unscanned ballots in section 1 of the Closing Verification Form.
4. Return the Unscanned Ballot Bag to the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag.

Retrieve Closing Verification Form and DS200 Unit Log(s): Remove the Opening and Closing Verification Form and DS200 Unit Log(s) from the Clerks Folder. The Daily Closing Verification Form (on the reverse side of the Opening Verification Form) is dedicated to recording the total ballots cast at the polling place and verifying essential voting supplies are returned each day of Early Voting. The DS200 Unit Log(s) are essential to helping know how many ballots were cast on any given day – it is used to calculate the number of ballots on each DS200.

Record Check-in Totals: Once the last voter has been processed, cast their ballot, and has left the polling place, retrieve from the e-pollbooks the total number of regular (issued) check-ins processed. Record the grand total of 'Issued' ballots in the Regular Check-Ins field of the Closing Verification Form.

Update DS200 Unit Log(s): In order to capture the daily total, first thing in the morning of each day, the clerk will record the beginning total (zero for the first day, subsequent days will be the end total from the day prior) in the Begin Total field for the respective date. At the end of voting for the day, the poll worker will record in section 1 on the Closing Verification Form in the Daily Scanned Ballot Total the number shown in the Public Count area at the top of the DS200 screen in the End Total column of the Unit Log. This is done for each DS200 until the last day of Early Voting.

Shutdown DS200 Unit(s): Steps are performed each day to shut down the DS200 unit. Shutdown procedures allow poll workers to reopen the poll the subsequent

days of Early Voting. Immediately after the last voter has voted and departed the polling room and after recording the daily scanned ballot totals, the DS200 unit(s) are shut down. Once the screen turns completely black, the poll worker will close and lock the DS200 monitor, and will close, latch, and lock the lid.

Provisional and Spoiled Ballot: Remove the provisional ballots enclosed inside the Provisional Ballot Bag and count the number of envelopes. The number counted should match the number indicated in the ePollbook. Record this number in section 1 of the Closing Verification Form. Then, return the provisional ballots to the Provisional Ballot Bag and place the Provisional Ballot Bag in the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag. If the number counted does not match the number indicated in the ePollbook, an incident report documenting the reason for the discrepancy is submitted by the Clerk. The same steps are used to count and record the number of spoiled ballots – Retrieve the Spoiled Ballot Envelope. Remove and count the spoiled ballots. Verify the total counted matches the number indicated in the ePollbook and record this total in section 1 of the Closing Verification Form. Return the spoiled ballots to the Spoiled Ballot Envelope and place the envelope in the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag.

Account For and Pack All Voted Ballots: When removing the ballots from the ballot box, the poll workers ensure that the box is checked thoroughly so that no ballots are left inside.

Unlock the Ballot Box door and remove the ballots. Once removed, ensure that the ballots are stacked in the same orientation and placed neatly into the Black Ballot Bag.

Shut the ballot box door and relock.

1. Ensure all cancelled VBM ballots and completed Multi-Purpose Forms are placed inside the Completed Forms Envelope and the envelope is placed in the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag.
2. Make sure the DS200 Reports Bag (with DS200 reports enclosed) and Accident Forms Envelope (with completed Accident Forms enclosed) are placed in the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag.
3. Remove the numbered seals from the side pocket of the Black Ballot Bag. Secure the Black Ballot Bag by closing all zippers and placing numbered seals on each zipper that accesses the ballots enclosed

inside. Record the seal numbers placed on the Black Ballot Bag in section 2 of the Daily Closing Verification Form.

4. Retrieve the SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container and record the seal number in section 2 of the Closing Verification Form.
5. Finish completing section 2 of the Daily Closing Verification Form confirming the items listed are placed in the Black Ballot Bag.
6. In section 3 of the Daily Closing Verification Form, the Clerk and Assistant Clerk must sign, date, and record the time. Signatures confirm all information in sections 1, 2, and 3 are true and correct.
7. Have the Daily Closing Verification Form, Black Ballot Bag(s) and VBM Ballot Box ready and near the entrance/exit door for courier pickup.

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The DS200 Ballot Box is capable of holding approximately 2,500 sheets of paper. A Full Ballot Box Procedure is implemented when the ballot box has received more sheets of paper than it is designed to contain. Poll Worker Services will advise the Clerk how to proceed based on expected voter turnout and the time of day. If Poll Worker Services advises that the voted ballots should be removed from the ballot box before the polls close, the clerk will perform the steps below to securely transfer ballots from the DS200 unit to a Black Ballot Bag to store the voted ballots.

The Clerk and DS200 Inspector will:

1. Inform the voters that there will be a slight delay in voting as the ballot box is full and the ballots must be removed and secured.
2. Open the main compartment of the Black Ballot Bag and remove any items inside, if applicable.
3. Break the seal and open the ballot box door.
4. Remove the ballots and place them neatly inside the Black Ballot Bag.
5. Zip the compartments of the Black Ballot Bag closed, and seal with a numbered seal.
6. Place the Black Ballot Bag in a secure location within the polling room.
7. Complete an incident report in the ePollbook recording the seal numbers placed on the Black Ballot Bag, and documenting the removal of ballots from the ballot box.
8. Close and reseal the ballot box door. Resume voting.

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Provisional Ballot Voter's Certificate and Affirmation Envelope is a large white envelope that the voter and the Clerk or Assistant Clerk must complete before the voter can receive their provisional ballot. All provisional ballot voters must return to the Voter Assistance Table once the voter has marked their ballot. The voted provisional ballot and the green striped privacy folder are sealed inside the completed Provisional Ballot Voter's Certificate and Affirmation Envelope and placed inside the green Provisional Ballot Bag. Poll workers are trained to not allow a voter to insert their voted provisional ballot into the DS200 unit.

The Voted Provisional Ballot Bag is a large green zippered bag that all voted and sealed Provisional Ballot Affirmation and Certificate envelopes must be placed in after the voter returns their voted provisional ballot. Once the voter returns to the Voter Assistance Table with his or her provisional ballot, the poll worker will place the privacy folder, with provisional ballot inside, into the voter's completed Provisional Ballot Voter's Certificate and Affirmation envelope and seal the envelope. The poll worker will then verify that the tracking number found on the upper right-hand corner of the certificate envelope, matches the one on the Notice of Rights to Provisional Ballot Voters and give the notice to the voter.

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Marksense ballots sorted by the DS200 tabulator and/or DS850 scanner, which could not be read, are presented to the Canvassing Board for inspection and determination of voter intent. When necessary, these ballots are forwarded to the Duplication Team to be recorded and duplicated, according to instructions from the Canvassing Board. After duplication, the ballots are processed and counted. Ballots that are received ripped, torn, wrinkled or otherwise damaged and cannot be fed through the tabulators are, at the direction of the Canvassing Board, forwarded to duplication.

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Back up of voting system programs includes: all software is retained on media and can be reinstalled; the electronic voting systems are backed up prior to the election and after results are collected; the DS200 ballot scanners produce a printed results tape; the voted ballots could be reprocessed; the voting system program may also be retained by the state via the required system parameter filing.

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When the tabulators are returned on the final day of Early Voting, they are placed in the secured restricted access tabulation room, under continuous CCTV surveillance. Under the direction of the Director of IT, the election is closed, the results tape is printed, and the results are uploaded into the Election Management system as required by statute. The uploaded results are compared against the DS200 tapes and voter turnout.

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Each day of Early Voting, a courier dispatched from the Elections Office retrieves the Black Ballot Bag(s) and SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container. The courier will also deliver any requested supplies. Once the courier arrives, the Clerk will give them the Daily Closing Verification Form so that they can verify that the seal numbers recorded on the form match the seals securing the bag(s) and SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container. Once they that confirm that the information matches, the courier will complete section 4 of the Closing Verification Form, then place the completed Closing Verification Form in the side, unsealed pocket of the Black Ballot Bag. The courier will load the Black Ballot Bag and SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container inside their vehicle and immediately depart for the Elections Office.

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Voters voting a provisional ballot complete a Provisional Ballot Voter's Certificate and Affirmation, which is printed on the provisional ballot envelope. The certificate has the voter's information, reason for provisional ballot, and an area for researching and canvassing the voter's eligibility. Upon review of the certificate and affirmation, the Canvassing Board determines the voter's eligibility. Accepted provisional ballots are recorded and added to the election results. At the conclusion of canvassing and processing of the provisional ballots, voters may check the status of their provisional ballot on the SOE website.

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For daily reconciliation, the previous day's voted ballots are counted. This count is compared to data derived from the ballot counter on the DS200s, and the number of voter check-ins. Any discrepancy is immediately addressed by reviewing daily incident forms, examining epollbook check-in data, and contacting the location Clerk for information to resolve any discrepancy.

## Election Day requirements

- a. Accountability, storage, specific security measures taken for ballots and election materials on ED.
- b. Verify number of ballots received at ED precincts; received correct ballots for that precinct.
- c. Verifying that a voter, choosing to vote on ED, receives the correct ballot.
- d. Verifying identification, seal, and protective counter numbers of voting devices used at ED precincts.
- e. Process for sealing or verifying the seals on the ballot box(es) used at ED precincts.
- f. Process for verifying the operability and readiness of voting devices used at ED precincts.
- g. Verifying all counters except protective counters are set at zero on each voting device used at ED precincts.
- h. Printing record from each voting device at ED precincts to ensure no votes on voting device. (i.e., zero tapes).
- i. How unscanned and spoiled ballots are handled at Election Day precincts.
- j. Process for accounting for and monitoring VBM ballots deposited at a SBIS at SOE office.
- k. Verification if electronic or voter authorization slips/stubs, used to track voter during ED.
- l. Handling voting system malfunctions at ED precincts.
- m. Securing voting machines at the close of the polls to prevent further voting at ED precincts.
- n. Accounting of all ballots and hybrid voting system paper outputs after the polls close at ED precincts.
- o. Sealing or verifying seals voter authorization slips container(s) if used at ED precincts.
- p. Tabulation of votes for ED
  - I. Counting and reconciliation of voted ballots and ExpressVote outputs at ED precincts.
  - II. Processing and recording write-in and provisional ballots at ED precincts.
  - III. Handling unreadable ballots at ED precincts.
  - IV. Backup and recovery of tabulated results and voting system programs on ED.
  - V. Printing of precinct results and results from individual tabulating device; recording and verifying votes cast.
  - VI. Endorsing the ED precinct results by the Election Board.
  - VII. Post a copy of ED precinct results.
  - VIII. Transport ED precinct results to a central or regional site.
  - IX. Consolidation of precinct and provisional ballot results.
  - X. Public viewing of the accumulation process.
  - XI. Reconciling discrepancies between unused, tabulated, provisional, unscanned ballots; other discrepancies found during the accumulation process.

Election Boards for each polling location are appointed by the SOE, pursuant to §102.012, Florida Statutes. An Election Board is comprised of poll workers who serve as Clerks and Inspectors. At least one poll worker is assigned as deputy at each polling location. All Election Board members receive training prior to scheduled elections, pursuant to §102.014, Florida Statutes.

The **Opening Verification Form (OVF)** is a document that allows the office to verify and affirm the secure exchange of documents, ballots, and equipment from departure from the Elections Office to delivery to the respective polling locations.

Poll Workers verify and affirm that the correct equipment was delivered, and that each item listed was delivered in the manner and quantity outlined on the form and that no tampering has taken place.

### OVF Section 1 – ePollbook and MiFi Verification

Completed Monday by the Clerk and Assistant Clerk. They verify the labels on the ePollbooks and MiFi match information on this form by placing a checkmark in the appropriate fields.

### OVF Section 2 – DS200 Unit Verification

Completed on Monday, once the AutoKart cover is removed, the Clerk and Assistant Clerk verify the seals on the DS200 lid and ballot box door match the information on this form by placing a checkmark in the appropriate fields. The DS200 Unit is delivered locked and sealed. No seals are removed nor is the unit opened until Tuesday morning, Election Day. If a seal is broken, or a poll worker suspects the seal may have been tampered with, or the label information on the devices or voting equipment do not match the information on this form, a call is placed immediately to the SOE office.

### OVF Section 3 – Ballot Verification

On Tuesday morning, the Clerk along with an Election Board member of another party affiliation, break the seal and remove the ballots stored inside the ballot box. The Clerk and one other Election Board member of a different party affiliation count the number of ballots packed in the ballot box. The ballot count is compared to the recorded totals on the Opening Verification Form to ascertain correctness. If there are any discrepancies the Clerk immediately calls the SOE. The ballots are then compared to the precinct's sample ballot to ensure the proper ballot(s) was issued.

### OVF Section 4 – DS200 Tabulator and Election Zero Report Verification

On Tuesday morning, the Clerk and Assistant Clerk verify the seal numbers on the Lid Seal, and Ballot Box Seal, and the DS200 serial number, on the Opening Verification Form. If, during this procedure, the Election Board discovers evidence of damage to or tampering with any seal on the DS200 tabulator, the tabulator in question is not put into service and the SOE office is notified immediately.

The Clerk and Assistant Clerk perform the following steps:

1. Break the seal securing the Auxiliary bin. Use the key to open the bin. Check inside the bin to make sure no ballots or debris are inside.
2. Break the seal securing the DS200 lid. Use the key, unlock the lock, lift the latches and open the lid.
3. Verify the serial number on the DS200 matches the serial number preprinted in section 4 of the Opening Verification Form.
4. Use the key, unlock the display screen and raise it up. Since the AutoKart is plugged in and receiving power, once the screen is placed in the upright position, the DS200 will automatically power on.
5. On the opening screen, enter the election code, then press Accept. The Configuration Report will immediately begin to print. The Configuration Report lists storage memory availability, firmware and scanner information that has already been verified by the Elections Office.
6. Press the Open Poll button on the screen The Election Zero Report will print. Tear off both reports, leaving the Configuration Report attached to the Election Zero Report. Verify that all races appear and each race has zero vote totals. The Election Zero Report, produced at poll opening, shows the tabulator precinct number/polling

location designation and the ballot count at zero, confirming that no votes for any of the races or issues are recorded. The Clerk and Assistant Clerk review and verify that the date, time, precinct(s) and site location are correct. They also verify the values are zero for the ballot count and each race or issue. The Election Zero Report is also compared to the sample ballot to ensure the races or issues are the same.

7. The Clerk and Assistant Clerk sign the Election Zero Report and place it in the DS200 Reports Bag.
8. Once the Zero Report is verified and signed, press the Go to Voting Mode button. The 'Welcome. Please insert your ballot' screen appears and the DS200 is ready for voting.
9. Place the Configuration and Election Zero Reports inside the DS200 Reports Bag.
10. Place a checkmark, where indicated, to confirm the serial number matches, all races have zero vote totals, the correct date, time, and location is displayed on the DS200 screen, and the zero report is signed by the Clerk and Assistant Clerk.

### OVF Section 5 – Certification

The Clerk, Assistant Clerk and another Election Board member sign, date and indicate the time to affirm all steps have been completed and verified.

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In preparation for distribution to a voter at the Ballot Distribution Table, ballots are placed into the ballot sorter inside the Ballot Tray. Ballots at the Ballot Distribution Table remain stored in the ballot tray at all times until a voter comes to retrieve their ballot. The ballot style label on the tray corresponds to the ballot style on the ballot. Ballot pads not in use at the Ballot Distribution Table are stored inside the gray supply tub, secured at the Voter Assistance Table.

After a voter has checked in and been verified as eligible to vote in the election at the precinct, the poll worker writes the ballot style number on a Ballot Style Ticket and initials where indicated. The Ballot Style Ticket is handed to the voter and they are directed to the Ballot Distribution Table.

The ballots are positioned in a way that they are not accessible to anyone but Poll Workers. Ballots remain in the ballot tray until a voter presents themselves to receive a ballot with their Ballot Style Ticket. The poll worker exchanges the ballot for the Ballot Style Ticket,

asking the voter to confirm that the ballot style numbers on the ticket and the ballot match.

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If a voter makes a mistake on his or her ballot, a replacement ballot may be issued to the voter at the Voter Assistance Table. Voters are allowed two replacement ballots. In the event an election has more than one page, the voter is allowed two replacement ballots per page. The Clerk or Assistant Clerk at the Voter Assistance Table completes the required information on the Spoiled Ballot Log and ensures the voter signs the Log. The Clerk or Assistant Clerk places the spoiled ballot into the spoiled ballot envelope. The number of spoiled ballots are counted and recorded on the Closing Verification Form as part of the ballot reconciliation process. All spoiled ballots are placed in the Spoiled Ballot Envelope and then in the Black Ballot Bag, which is secured with a numbered seal for return to the SOE office.

Voters may not receive a replacement ballot if they have already cast their ballot into the DS200. If a voter insists on receiving a replacement ballot after they have already cast a ballot, the voter is issued a provisional ballot. The reason the provisional ballot is being issued is documented on the Provisional Ballot Voter's Certificate and Affirmation envelope.

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The DS200 Ballot Box is capable of holding approximately 2,500 sheets of paper. A Full Ballot Box Procedure is implemented when the ballot box may receive more sheets of paper than it is designed to contain. When the current election is a single-page ballot, the public count located on the blue bar of the display screen, just above the protected count, will increase by one for each ballot cast. When the counter reaches approximately 2,400, the Full Ballot Box Procedure may be implemented, depending on how much time is left in the voting day. When the current election is a two-page ballot, the public count will still only increase by one when the voter casts the first page of the ballot. When the counter reaches approximately 1,200, the Clerk and REP are alerted so that Full Ballot Box Procedures may be implemented. In the event of a three-page ballot, the public count will again increase, by one when the voter casts their ballot. In this instance, Full Ballot Box Procedures may be implemented when the public count reaches approximately 800.

If the Full Ballot Box Procedures are implemented, the REP will supervise the secure transfer of ballots from the DS200 unit to a Black Ballot Bag to store the voted ballots. The Clerk and DS200 Inspector will:

1. Inform the voters that there will be a slight delay in voting as the ballot box is full and the ballots must be removed and secured to continue voting on the DS200.
2. Open the main compartment of the Black Ballot Bag and remove any items inside, if applicable.
3. Break the seal and open the ballot box door.
4. Remove the ballots and place them neatly inside the Black Ballot Bag.
5. Zip the compartments of the Black Ballot Bag closed, and seal with a numbered seal.
6. Place the Black Ballot Bag in a secure location within the polling room.
7. Complete an incident report in the ePollbook recording the seal numbers placed on the Black Ballot Bag, and document the removal of ballots from the ballot box.
8. Close and reseal the ballot box door.
9. Resume voting.

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Clerks have access to their assigned field operation support through a designated phone number, as well as access to the IT Help Desk. If a DS200 tabulator malfunctions, the Clerk contacts the IT Help Desk. If possible, the malfunction is resolved via the IT Help Desk. The IT Help Desk may deploy support for onsite assistance in troubleshooting the issue. If the resolution results in the replacement of voting equipment, Warehouse or IT staff provide the replacement equipment. In these instances, a DS200 Exchange Form is completed and signed by the Warehouse or IT staff and the Clerk.

The DS200 unit has an uninterruptible power supply with an internal battery that is continuously charged, enabling the tabulator to continue counting ballots for a limited time during a power failure. In the event of a power failure, the Clerk will immediately call the REP to inform them of the situation. The DS200 unit may accept ballots a little slower than usual; however, as long as it accepts the ballots, the unit is working and votes are being recorded.

If the internal battery is depleted, the Clerk will break the seal and unlock the Auxiliary Bin. Voters are instructed to insert their voted ballot inside the Auxiliary Bin until power is restored. Once power is

restored, the Clerk will relock and seal the Auxiliary Bin and resume normal procedures. The Clerk will submit an incident report documenting the power failure and then update the incident report to include the time the power was restored.

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On Election Day when the polls close and precinct tabulation has been completed, the Clerk and/or the Assistant Clerk record on the Closing Verification Form (CVF) the number of "Ballots Cast" from the Election Results Tape. The Clerk and/or the Assistant Clerk count the number of unscanned ballots, the number of spoiled ballots, and the number of voted provisional ballots, and record these totals on the Closing Verification Form. All voted ballots are placed in the Black Ballot Bag and secured with a numbered seal for return to the SOE office. All unused ballots are counted and placed in the DS200 unit ballot box. The ballot box door is sealed and the seal number is documented on the Closing Verification Form. The Black Ballot Bag is brought to the Drop Sites and then returned to the SOE office. The DS200 and election supplies (on the AutoKart) are picked up by or under the direction of Warehouse staff for return to the SOE.

The following procedures are implemented at the closing of the polls on election day:

1. Outside the entrance to the polling place at 7:00 PM, the Clerk will announce "The Polls are now closed. Voters currently in line can still cast a ballot; however, no additional voters may enter this line."
2. Once the Clerk makes this announcement, the deputy will stand behind the last person in line to establish the completion of voting. If a voter attempts to enter the line, the voter is informed that the polls have closed and they cannot enter the line. If the voter is confrontational, the Clerk is notified and he or she can contact the REP or the Elections Office for additional support. The deputy will also inform the Clerk if there is a line at the time of closing with the approximate number of voters. The Clerk will inform the Election Phone Bank.
3. Any voters in line at 7 PM are allowed to cast a ballot. Voters continue to cast ballots as they would prior to 7 PM.
4. After the final voter has cast their ballot and departed, any public observers who want to observe the closing of the poll may now enter the polling room. Any available chairs are placed along the wall for observers.

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Immediately after the last voter has voted and departed the polling room, the following steps are performed to close the poll on the DS200.

1. Unlock and open the access door to reveal the power and close polls buttons. Press the Close Polls button.
2. Press the Close Poll button on the screen to confirm the polls should be closed. The DS200 will automatically print 2 copies of the Election Results Report.
3. The next screen to appear will allow the poll worker to transfer the election results by pressing Begin Modem Process. The DS200 will connect to the secure server at the Elections Office to transfer the results. Sending Results – Please Wait screen with several statuses will appear as the transfer process proceeds.
4. Once the transfer is complete, the screen will display Successfully Sent Results. If the results are not successfully transferred after three attempts, the poll worker will power down the unit, wait until the screen has gone black twice, remove the memory stick and secure it inside the Elections Result Container. A designated poll worker will then bring the memory stick to the Elections Service Center for manual upload.
5. When the DS200 has finished sending the results, a screen will appear indicating the unit can be turned off. The poll worker is instructed to wait to power down the unit until they receive a text message from the SOE office indicating that the site's results were received. Once text confirmation of successful results transmission is received, the poll worker may proceed with powering down the DS200 by pressing the Finished– Turn Off button.
6. Election Results Reports are removed, and the Clerk and Assistant Clerk each sign both copies.
7. One copy is placed inside the Election Results Container, located inside the Election Results Bag. The second copy is posted on the exterior door of the polling room.
8. Once the DS200 screen is completely black and the power light is off, the poll worker will remove the DS200 memory stick and secure it inside the Election Results Container with the Elections Results Report.
9. The seal inside the Elections Results Bag is removed and the Election Results Container is sealed. The seal number is written on the Closing

Verification Form, and the container is placed inside the Election Results Bag.

10. The DS200 monitor/screen is closed and locked; the DS200 lid is closed, the latched secured and the lid locked.
11. The AutoKart power strip is turned off and unplugged from the electrical outlet and secured onto the AutoKart.

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The ExpressVote closing instructions are to be completed by at least one Inspector unless there is a request for assistance from another team member.

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Once the last voter has been processed, cast their ballot, and left the polling place, the following processes are used to account for and pack ballots.

Remove the **provisional ballots** enclosed inside the Provisional Ballot Bag and count the number of envelopes. The number counted should match the number indicated in the ePollbook. The poll worker will record this number in section 1 of the Closing Verification Form, return the provisional ballots to the Provisional Ballot Bag, and place the Provisional Ballot Bag in the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag. If the number counted does not match the number indicated in the ePollbook, an incident report documenting the reason for the discrepancy is submitted.

The poll worker will retrieve the Spoiled Ballot Envelope, remove and count the **spoiled ballots**, verify the total counted matches the number indicated in the ePollbook and record this total in section 1 of the Closing Verification Form. The poll worker will return the spoiled ballots to the Spoiled Ballot Envelope and place the envelope in the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag. If the number counted does not match the number indicated in the ePollbook, an incident report documenting the reason for the discrepancy is submitted.

Removal of **unscanned ballots** from the DS200 Auxiliary Bin is completed by the Clerk and an Election Board member of a different party affiliation as follows: Remove the seal on the Auxiliary Bin, open the bin and thoroughly check for any ballots deposited inside; retrieve the Unscanned Ballot Bag from the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag and enclose the unscanned ballots inside the blue Unscanned Ballot Bag; write the total number of unscanned ballots in

section 1 of the Closing Verification Form; return the Unscanned Ballot Bag to the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag.

**Regular voted ballots** are retrieved as follows: the poll worker will unlock the Ballot Box door and remove the ballots inside, ensure that the ballots are stacked in the same orientation and place the ballots neatly into the Black Ballot Bag. The poll worker will remove the numbered seals from the side pocket of the Black Ballot Bag, secure the Black Ballot Bag by closing all zippers and place numbered seals on each of the 3 zippers that accesses the ballots enclosed inside.

**Unused ballots** are collected from the Ballot Distribution Table and gray supply tub at the Voter Assistance Table. All loose, unused ballots (ballots that are no longer in the shrink-wrapped packaging and were never issued to voters) are placed into the Unused Ballot Bag(s) in the Black Ballot Bag. Any ballots that were not used during Election Day remain in their packaging.

**Unused ExpressVote Ballots** are returned into the ExpressVote Ballot bag. All unused, shrink-wrapped ballot packages, the Unused Ballot Bag, and the ExpressVote Ballot bag are placed into the empty ballot box bin. The ballot box door is closed and relocked. A numbered seal from the side pocket of the Black Ballot Bag is retrieved and placed on ballot box door lock.

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The **Closing Verification Form (CVF)** is used to record the total ballots cast at the polling place and verify that voting supplies are returned Election night.

#### CVF Section 1 – Ballot Count

The Clerk records the totals for Regular Ballots Cast (totals from public count on DS200 or from Election Results Tape); Regular Check-Ins (total from ePollbook under Issued); Provisional Ballots (provisional envelopes placed in green Provisional Ballot Bag); Unscanned Ballots (ballots removed from Auxiliary Bin and placed in blue Unscanned Ballot Bag); Spoiled Ballots (ballots placed in gray Spoiled Ballot Envelope); and Unused Ballots (ballots that have not been issued).

#### CVF Section 2 – Items Returned

The Clerk confirms each item listed has been placed inside the Black Ballot Bag, records each seal number placed on the compartments of the Black Ballot Bag, and confirms each item listed has been placed in the Clerk's Briefcase.

CVF Section 3 – Seals on Unused Ballots and DS200 Memory Stick Containers

The Clerk records the seal numbers on the Ballot Box into which unused (unissued) ballots and ExpressVote cards are placed. The Clerk also records the seal numbers for the memory stick containers.

CVF Section 4 – Certification

The Clerk and another election board member sign, date, and record the time the form was completed.

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On election night, the poll workers (usually the clerks) deliver their ballots, custody forms, electronic poll books, zero tape, results tape, configuration report, memory stick and supplies to one of the regional drop sites. Staff at the drop sites handle the check-ins.

When the Closing Verification Form is completed, the Black Ballot Bag(s), Clerk’s Briefcase, and AutoKart are packed, and all closing and packing procedures to restore the polling place to its original state have been performed, the clerk uses the Drop Site Information Sheet to return the Election Results Container, Black Ballot Bag(s), and Clerk’s Briefcase to the designated Drop Site.

The Clerk’s Briefcase and Black Ballot Bag(s) are loaded into the Clerk’s vehicle, preferably the trunk. The Election Results Container is loaded into the vehicle, preferably the passenger seat.

To minimize the wait time and/or any confusion at the Drop Site, the clerk will follow the directional signs to the supplies delivery point, and remain in the line in which they arrived to ensure this operation is done smoothly and accurately.

The clerk will remain in the vehicle. Once they arrive to the delivery point, the Drop Site representative will retrieve the Election Results Container, Black Ballot Bag(s) and Clerk’s Briefcase from the vehicle.

Once the Drop Site representative has verified receipt of these items the clerk is officially released from Election Day duties.

The Drop Site staff:

- ✓ Receive the DS200 Reports Bag (containing the zero report, results tape, configuration report, and DS200 memory stick) and records the time of receipt.

- ✓ Receive the precinct/polling location Black Ballot Bag (containing voted, unscanned, spoiled and provisional ballots, and backup precinct registers) and Clerk’s Briefcase (containing electronic poll books) and records the time of receipt.
- ✓ Verify the Memory Stick Container (enclosed inside the DS200 Reports Bag) and Black Ballot Bag seal numbers.

During election night check-in, staff at the ESC remove the precinct/polling location provisional ballot bag and send it to staff to verify the number of provisional ballots against the Closing Verification Form. The electronic poll books are removed from the Clerk’s Briefcase and back up precinct registers removed from the Black Ballot Bag and are delivered to staff for post-processing and voter history update.

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The voting method employed for polling locations uses a Marksense ballot completed by the voter and then inserted into the DS200 tabulator by the voter. The DS200 is programmed to retain the election totals for the respective precinct and furnish a tabulation of the precinct results at the closing of the polls. The SOE may receive precinct results via secure modem from precinct/polling location DS200 tabulators, after the polls have closed, and accumulate these results for reporting and public viewing.

If the results are not transmitted by modem for any reason, the Clerk, Assistant Clerk, or other designated poll worker will deliver the DS200 memory stick to the ESC for direct uploading of election results.

The DS200 memory stick and ballots from Election Day are returned to the ESC on election night from the drop off locations and placed in secure storage.

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A Write-in Board, which consists of two SOE staff members, is given write-in reports that include images of all VBM, Early Vote, Election Day and provisional write-in votes. The Write-in Board identifies votes cast for qualified write-in candidates and presents its findings to the Canvassing Board for verification. Totals for qualified write-in candidates are given to the Director of Information Technology for inclusion with Election Vote Totals.

\*\*\*

Provisional ballots are issued at the Voter Assistance Table. The voter is given the Provisional Ballot Voter’s

Certificate and Affirmation envelope and instructed to complete section 1. The Clerk or Assistant Clerk completes the information in sections 2 and 3. The Clerk or Assistant Clerk then provides the voter a ballot inside a provisional ballot privacy folder. The privacy folders designated for provisional ballots have a green stripe along the spine of the folder. The voter takes the ballot, marks the ballot, and places the ballot into the privacy folder. The voter returns to the Voter Assistance Table to place the privacy folder with ballot inside into the Provisional Ballot Voter's Certificate and Affirmation envelope. This envelope is sealed and inserted into the Voted Provisional Ballot Bag. After the polls have closed, and the last voter has cast his/her ballot, the voted Provisional Ballot Voter's Certificate and Affirmation envelopes are removed from the Voted Provisional Ballot Bag. The envelopes are counted and the total is recorded on the Closing Verification Form as part of the ballot reconciliation process. After counting and recording the number of voted Provisional Ballot Voter's Certificate and Affirmation envelopes, the envelopes are returned to the Voted Provisional Ballot Bag and then placed in the Black Ballot Bag, which is secured with a numbered seal for return to the SOE office.

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Marksense ballots sorted by the DS200 tabulator and/or DS850 scanner, which could not be read, are presented to the Canvassing Board for inspection and determination of voter intent. When necessary, these ballots are forwarded to the Duplication Team to be recorded and duplicated, according to instructions from the Canvassing Board. After duplication, the ballots are processed and counted.

Ballots that are received ripped, torn, wrinkled or otherwise damaged and cannot be fed through the DS850 scanners are, at the direction of the Canvassing Board, forwarded to duplication.

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Back up of voting system programs includes: all software is retained on media and can be reinstalled; the electronic voting systems are backed up prior to the election and after results are collected; the DS200 ballot scanners produce a printed results tape; the voted ballots could be reprocessed; the voting system program may also be retained by the state via the required system parameter filing.

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At the precinct/polling location, after the polls close, the Clerk and Assistant Clerk secure the tabulator from further voting. Once voting has ended, the DS200 tabulator prints a results tape and is ready to transmit results to the ESC. The results tape is signed by the Clerk and Assistant Clerk and delivered to the designated regional drop site on election night. A copy of the results tape is printed and posted for public viewing at the precinct/polling location by the Election Board after the polls have closed.

\*\*\*

If a court or the Governor extends voting hours, voters vote using a provisional ballot. The normal provisional ballot procedure is followed except that the extended hours provisional ballots are segregated from the normal provisional ballots. All extended hours provisional ballots are placed in the Black Ballot Bag and secured with a numbered seal for return to the SOE Office.

Voters voting a provisional ballot complete a Provisional Ballot Voter's Certificate and Affirmation, which is printed on the provisional ballot envelope. The certificate has the voter's information, reason for provisional ballot, and an area for researching and canvassing the voter's eligibility. Upon review of the certificate and affirmation, the Canvassing Board determines the voter's eligibility. Accepted provisional ballots are recorded and added to the election results. At the conclusion of canvassing and processing of the provisional ballots, voters may check the status of their provisional ballot on the SOE website.

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Collection and reporting of election results is done in the tabulation room at the ESC located in Tampa, FL. Viewing of the process is facilitated by windows between the tabulation room and the public/media room.

Election results are displayed on monitors in the public/media room during the Election Night tabulation process. Printed preliminary results may be provided periodically throughout the tabulation process and made available to various press agencies in hard copy or by fax or email. Results are also available on the SOE website.

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Any discrepancy between the number of voters who checked in via electronic poll books and signed the

precinct register and the tabulation count is described by the Clerk on the Closing Verification Form or on a Voting Incident Form. Comparison of precinct tape results and results received via modem is conducted by the Canvassing Board to confirm the match of all results. Following the election, precinct total numbers and precinct electronic poll book and register numbers are reconciled again during the process of updating voter history.

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The process for accounting for and monitoring of VBM ballots deposited at a Secure Ballot Intake Station (SBIS) at the Supervisor's office include the following:

Each SBIS and Blue Ballot Transfer Container is labeled to indicate which location it will be used at and locked and sealed when in use.

The SBIS is delivered by SOE staff to the office where it will be used and placed so that it is under continual surveillance by SOE staff.

During the day, as monitored by SOE staff, if a replacement is needed due to high volume, a new SBIS is delivered (labeled, sealed and locked) and the original SBIS is returned to the secured, surveilled, restricted access VBM cage at the ESC Warehouse. The SBIS or Blue Ballot Transfer Container is never opened except when it is returned to the VBM cage and in the custody of the Director of Voter Services.

When opened in the VBM cage, a daily SBIS Count Form is maintained to record the number of VBM ballots received in the SBIS. The ballots are then processed as per standard VBM ballot handling.

On Election Day, each SBIS at the Supervisor of Elections offices is removed from service at 7:00 PM when voting has ended, and returned to the VBM cage for standard VBM ballot handling.

## Vote-by-mail ballot handling

- a. Security measures for transporting, collecting, and storing blank and voted VBM ballots and related materials prior to and after an election
- b. Determining and verifying VBM ballot variations (i.e., UOCAVA, SWAB, FWAB, or Dom Civ).
- c. Verify that voters are issued the correct VBM ballot.
- d. Precluding voters from voting at the polls and casting a VBM ballot.
- e. Receiving and recording receipt of VBM ballots (Dom Civ, SWAB, FWAB) and determining which ones should be counted if more than one per voter is received.
- f. Security measures to ensure safekeeping of VBM ballots by the SOE.
- g. Opening valid VBM ballots in preparation for tabulation.
- h. Recording and storing the voted ballots or ExpressVote outputs which were duplicated.
- i. Allowing the public to examine VBM ballots prior to opening and processing.

VBM ballots are received directly from the contract printer and stored in a secured restricted area in the custody of the Director of Operations and Support Services and designated staff. VBM ballots are printed and delivered daily as needed.

VBM ballots are processed at the ESC on DS850 high-speed readers designed for this purpose, or on DS200 tabulators that are programmed to accept multiple precinct styles.

VBM ballot styles are determined by processes described in the section titled Ballot Preparation. A barcode containing the precinct, split (if applicable), party (if applicable) and page number is assigned to each unique precinct ballot variation and printed in the margin of the ballot sheet.

The quantity of ballots ordered for VBM voting is determined by the number of requests on file for each ballot style. Ballots may also be printed upon demand, either by in-house Ballot on Demand (BOD) printing or through an off-site vendor.

After receipt from the supplier, ballots are inspected, logged in, and stored in a secured area in the ESC warehouse.

In preparation for mailing, the VBM ballot coordinator requests and receives, through the voter registration system, a VBM ballot mailing list in batches – uniformed services and civilians residing overseas; absent domestic military voters residing within the United States; voters who registered by mail and who have not met statutory ID requirements; and domestic civilian

voters. From these batches, the VBM ballot packages are assembled by the Blue Crest Relia-Vote system.

A team of at least two designated SOE employees coordinates the operation of the Relia-Vote system, which ensures that each voter that has requested a VBM ballot receives their ballot. The Relia-Vote system tracks every ballot from the time the ballot enters the system until the ballot is sorted for mailing by the US Postal Service. Additionally, the Relia-Vote system coordinates delivery tracking of ballots within the US Postal Service.

The voter's record reflects the date his/her request for a VBM ballot was received by the SOE, mailed by the VBM ballot department, and returned as voted to the SOE.

When the electronic poll books are prepared, if a voter has requested a VBM ballot, the notation "Absentee Ballot Mailed/Issued" is indicated. If a voted VBM ballot is received by the SOE, the notation "Absentee Ballot Received/Voted" or "VOTED" is indicated on the voter's record. These notations help the Election Board verify a voter's eligibility to vote in the precinct on Election Day.

The following procedures also preclude voters from voting at the polls or Early Voting and casting VBM ballots:

- A voter who requested and received a VBM ballot but then goes to the precinct/polling location on Election Day or Early Voting with the VBM ballot is allowed to vote a regular ballot if the VBM ballot is surrendered. The Poll Worker writes "Cancelled"

on the outer envelope of the VBM ballot. The cancelled VBM ballot is placed in the Completed Forms Envelope and returned to the SOE office.

- A voter who requested and received a VBM ballot but then goes to the precinct/polling location on Election Day or Early Voting without the VBM ballot is allowed to vote a provisional ballot if it cannot be determined whether the voted VBM ballot was received by the SOE. If it can be determined by contacting the SOE office or via the electronic poll book data base that the voter has not already voted a VBM ballot, the voter may vote a regular ballot at the precinct/polling location or Early Voting site. The VBM ballot is blocked.
- A voter who has requested and returned a VBM ballot to the SOE, but who goes to an Early Voting site or precinct/polling location on Election Day maintaining he/she has not returned the ballot and is still eligible to vote, will be given a provisional ballot.

The voter's record on the electronic poll book reflects the date his/her request for a VBM ballot was received by the SOE, mailed by the SOE to the voter, and returned as voted to the SOE.

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When VBM ballots in their unopened certificate envelopes are received by the SOE, they are date/time-stamped and logged into the voter registration system. The elector's signature on the certificate envelope is checked against the signature of record. All staff who perform signature verification are certified via the Department of State signature verification training course.

If the certificate has not been signed by the voter, or the signature does not match the signature on file, the ballot is set aside. Attempt is made to notify the voter that the signature is missing or mismatched. Until 5 PM on the second day after an election, the voter is allowed to complete and submit an affidavit in order to cure the unsigned or mismatched ballot.

If the VBM appears to be invalid (for reasons other than signature defects), the VBM ballot is coded for review by the Canvassing Board.

The voted ballots in their unopened certificate envelopes are stored by group batch, in a secured area at the ESC.

VBM ballots set aside for review by the Canvassing Board are presented to the board in their unopened certificate envelopes. All VBM ballots rejected as illegal by the Canvassing Board are retained unopened and in accordance with records retention schedules. The reason for rejection is noted and a tally of rejected ballots is made.

\*\*\*

Ballots accepted by the Canvassing Board are opened and processed in accordance with the following functions:

- Voted VBM ballot envelopes are slit open and placed in trays.
- Trays are delivered to SOE staff supervised by senior SOE management.
- Staff removes the secrecy envelopes/sleeves from the mailing envelopes.
- Staff checks the mailing envelopes to see that nothing has been left inside, and then sets the envelopes aside. Mailing envelopes are kept in group batch order.
- Staff removes the VBM ballots from the secrecy envelopes/sleeves.
- Staff stacks the secrecy envelopes/sleeves and checks to be sure that no VBM ballots have been left in them.
- When all of the envelopes have been opened, the ballots are placed in a container and delivered directly to the Director of Information Technology.
- After the VBM ballots have been tabulated, they are placed in a labeled container and stored in a secured area.

\*\*\*

State Write-in Ballots (SWAB) are canvassed on Election Day. If a regular VBM ballot is received from the voter after the State Write-in Ballot is received, the regular VBM ballot is counted for the election and the SWAB is canceled and retained unopened in a secure area with other canceled ballots.

When received by the SOE, Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWAB) are placed under the control of the VBM ballot coordinator. The FWAB is date/time-stamped

and logged into the voter registration system with a note flagging it as a FWAB. FWABs are held unopened until election night. If a FWAB is accepted and a regular VBM ballot is received prior to Election Day, the FWAB is canceled and the regular ballot is processed for the election.

Ballots received up to 10 days after the date of a federal or special election from overseas voters are placed under the control of the VBM ballot coordinator and are canvassed, opened, and counted in a presidential preference primary election and general election if postmarked by election day.

The Canvassing Board convenes on the tenth day following an election in which there are federal candidates or a special election. The regular VBM ballots or FWABs received after Election Day, until the tenth day following the federal election, are opened. The votes cast are manually recorded on a tally sheet and the total number of valid votes is added to the election totals on the final canvass report.

\*\*\*

As to custody of voted ballots returned by voters to offices of the SOE in a SBIS Ballot Box:

- Prior to Election Day, voted ballots in their certificate envelopes, sealed by the voters and returned to SOE offices are placed in a SBIS box. At the end of each day, the SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container or ballot box with the ballots is delivered to the VBM coordinator at the ESC by members of the SOE staff.
- On Election Day or night, voted ballots in their certificate envelopes, sealed by the voters and returned to SOE offices are placed in a SBIS ballot box. At 7:00 PM, on Election Day, the SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container or ballot box with the ballots are delivered to the VBM coordinator at the ESC by members of the SOE staff.

As to custody of voted ballots returned by voters to remote Early Voting locations:

- Voted ballots in their certificate envelopes, sealed by the voters and returned to Early Voting locations are placed in a SBIS ballot box. An SOE staff member maintains custody and control of the secure ballot box at all times. At the end of each day, the SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container with

the ballots is delivered to the VBM coordinator at the ESC by members of the SOE staff.

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Pursuant to §101.5612, Florida Statutes, the Logic and Accuracy Test for the optical scan readers is performed prior to the processing and scanning of VBM ballots. The optical scan tabulators are operated by a designated team under the direction of the Director of Information Technology. With the approval of the Canvassing Board, the opening and scanning process begins. The VBM coordinator presents the VBM Ballot Canvass Report to the Canvassing Board. VBM ballots that need a determination by the board are handled individually and processed separately. In the event a paper ballot is damaged to the point that it cannot be automatically read, the damaged ballot is duplicated as requested by the Canvassing Board.

VBM ballots are logged in batches by groups of precincts. A ballot custody sheet for each group is completed with the date, time, and number of VBM ballots presented for tabulation. A batch log is maintained as a double check that all VBM ballots have been accounted for. VBM ballots that have been processed are boxed and sealed. Any VBM ballots required for audits are retrieved under the direction of the Canvassing Board and transferred to a sealed container prepared for the audit team. In the alternative, as permitted by rule, the Canvassing Board may direct that an automated independent audit be performed using the Clear Audit system.

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Under the direction of the Canvassing Board, the functions of the Duplicating Board are performed by at least two members of the SOE staff. Each damaged or faxed ballot is consecutively numbered and stamped "ORIGINAL", and each replacement ballot is marked with the number of the ballot it duplicates and is stamped "DUPLICATE". One staff member marks the duplicate ballot according to the voter's intent as per the direction of the Canvassing Board, and the other staff member reviews and affirms the accuracy of the markings. The duplicated ballots are given to the Director of Information Technology for tabulation. All ballots that require duplication are stored, with a duplication log, in a secure duplication storage area separate from other voted ballots.

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**Observation of duplication** per F.S. 101.5614(4)(a) is accommodated as per the following:

1. Dates and times during which duplication is authorized to occur will be contained in a legal notice published in a newspaper of general circulation. This notice will also be available on the website.
2. The Supervisor of Elections office reserves the right to not duplicate during the authorized times, based on agency needs.
3. Each candidate, political party official, political committee official, or authorized designee thereof seeking to observe duplication shall submit the name of the designated observer to the Supervisor of Elections office. One person per candidate, political party, or political committee will be allowed in the duplication room at a time.
4. When arriving to observe, the designee must check in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a name tag which must be worn at all times.
5. Observers shall be restricted to a suitable area within the duplication room from which they can hear and see the duplication stations.
6. Use of personal computers and devices, including cell phones, is prohibited in the duplication room.
7. Eating or drinking is prohibited in the duplication room.
8. At no time can the observer touch any ballots or materials, or otherwise interfere with the activities underway in the duplication room. This includes directly communicating with staff performing duplication.
9. If an observer wishes to make a reasonable objection to a duplicate of a ballot, he or she will so indicate by raising his or her hand, at which time a staff member will provide the observer a form to complete and sign stating the basis for the objection. Staff will secure the complaint, the original ballot and the duplicate ballot for presentation to the Canvassing Board.

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**Observation of opening and processing VBM ballots** per F.S.101.5612(2) is accommodated as per the following:

1. Dates and times during which VBM opening may occur will be contained in a legal notice published in a newspaper of general circulation. This notice will also be available on the website.

2. The Supervisor of Elections office reserves the right to not open VBM ballots during the authorized times, based on agency needs.
3. Each party choosing to designate a representative for observation of VBM opening shall submit the name to the Supervisor of Elections office. One person per party will be allowed in the opening room at a time.
4. When arriving to observe, the designee must check in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a name tag which must be worn at all times.
5. The observer shall be restricted to a suitable area within the VBM opening room from which he or she can hear and see the opening stations.
6. Use of personal computers and devices, including cell phones, is prohibited in the opening room.
7. Eating or drinking is prohibited in the tabulation room.
8. At no time can the observer touch any ballots or materials, or otherwise interfere with the activities underway in the VBM opening room. This includes directly communicating with staff performing VBM opening.

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**Review or inspection of certain materials by authorized persons** per F.S. 101.572(2) is accommodated as per the following:

1. Dates and times during which review or inspection of certain materials by authorized person may occur will be contained in a legal notice published in a newspaper of general circulation. This notice will also be available on the website.
2. Each candidate, political party official, political committee official, or authorized designee thereof seeking to review or inspect certain materials shall complete a form requesting access and submit the form to the Supervisor of Elections office. Appointments are limited and will be assigned on a first-come, first-served basis.
3. The requester will designate the date he or she seeks reasonable access, and the materials to be inspected or reviewed.
4. When arriving to observe, the designee will check in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a name tag which must be worn at all times.
5. A staff member will escort the designee to the review/inspection area. A staff member will present the designee the materials requested for review or inspection.

6. Use of personal computers and devices, including cell phones, is prohibited in the review/inspection room.
7. Eating or drinking is prohibited in the review/inspection room.
8. At no time can the observer touch any ballots or materials.
9. The appointment will end promptly at the scheduled time.
7. Eating or drinking is prohibited in the tabulation room.
8. At no time can the observer touch any ballots or materials, or otherwise interfere with the activities underway in the tabulation room. This includes directly communicating with staff performing tabulation.

**Public inspection of ballots and certificates** per F.S. 101.572(1) is accommodated as follows:

**Observation of tabulation** as per F.S. 101.5612(2) is accommodated as follows:

1. Dates and times during which tabulation and testing may occur will be contained in a legal notice published in a newspaper of general circulation. This notice will also be available on the website.
2. The Supervisor of Elections office reserves the right to not tabulate during the authorized times, based on agency needs.
3. Each party choosing to designate a representative for observation of tabulation shall submit the name to the Supervisor of Elections office. One person per party will be allowed in the tabulation room at a time.
4. When arriving to observe, the designee must check in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a name tag which must be worn at all times.
5. The observer shall be restricted to a suitable area within the tabulation room from which he or she can hear and see the tabulation stations.
6. Use of personal computers and devices, including cell phones, is prohibited in the tabulation room.
1. Dates during which public inspection of ballots and certificates may occur will be contained in a legal notice published in a newspaper of general circulation. This notice will also be available on the website.
2. When arriving to observe, the member of the public will check in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a name tag which must be worn at all times.
3. Voter certificates on mailing envelopes processed the previous day will be available for inspection.
4. Ballots processed the previous day will be available for inspection.
5. Use of personal computers and devices, including cell phones, is prohibited in the review/inspection room.
6. Eating or drinking is prohibited in the review/inspection room.
7. At no time can the observer touch any ballots or materials.
8. No recordings or photos are allowed.
9. The session will end promptly as scheduled.

## Section 4: Post-election

### Receiving and preparing voted ballots (after 7 p.m. on Election Day)

- a. Receiving and preparing ExpressVote outputs and voted ballots, including provisional ballots, election data, and memory devices.
- b. Verify ballot containers are properly secured and accounted for and seal numbers are correct.
- c. Verify/reconcile ballot container(s) for each precinct contain hybrid voting system paper outputs, unused ballots, and voted ballots, including provisional ballots, unscanned ballots, spoiled ballots, and write-in ballots as shown to exist on the ballot accounting forms completed by each election board for that purpose.
- d. Inspect ballots or ExpressVote outputs to identify those that must be duplicated or upon which voter intent is unclear, thus, requiring a determination by the Canvassing Board, including the process used for keeping a record of which marksense ballots or paper outputs are submitted to the Canvassing Board and the disposition of those marksense ballots or paper outputs.

After the polls close, the DS200 results memory stick and Election Results Reports are removed from the DS200 ballot scanner. The memory stick and Election Results Report are placed inside a container that is secured with a numbered seal. The zero tape, configuration report, and sealed memory stick container (with memory stick and results report enclosed) are placed in the DS200 Reports Bag in the presence of the Election Board. The Clerk returns the Reports Bag (zero tape, results tape, configuration report, and results memory stick) to their assigned Drop Site.

The voted ballots are retrieved from the DS200 ballot box. The voted ballots are placed in a Black Ballot Bag and sealed with a numbered security seal. The Clerk returns the ballots in the Black Ballot Bag, along with the unscanned ballots, backup precinct registers, provisional ballots, spoiled ballots, and electronic poll books to their assigned Drop Site.

The Closing Verification Form documents the time that the DS200 Reports Bag left the precinct. At the Drop

Site, the Reports Bag Check-in Log documents the time the memory stick, zero tapes, configuration report, results tape, Black Ballot Bag and Clerk's Briefcase are delivered to the Drop Site by the Clerk.

On Election Night at the ESC Warehouse, staff under the direction of the Director of Operations and Support Services, receive materials from the regional drop sites, and scan the seals and/or barcodes on the critical items (black ballot bag in which is sealed regular voted ballots, clerk's briefcase, precinct registers, provisional ballot envelop, unscanned ballot envelop, and spoiled ballot envelop). An accounting is made for each precinct and location to assure all materials are in the possession of the SOE. On Election Night, staff begin processing provisional ballots, and continue this process if necessary the morning after the election. Unscanned ballots are delivered to the IT Director for tabulation. Any ballots that require duplication and determination of voter intent are processed as per Canvassing Board guidelines

## Post-election audit

- a. Random selection of races and precincts for a manual audit or automated independent audit, or both.
- b. Random selection of races and precincts if a separate municipal or local election is held on ED and the Canvassing Board certifies the elections, if applicable.
- c. Determine the ballot count of the random selection, segregated by ballot type.
- d. Allow the public to inspect the VBM ballots before moving forward with conducting the post-election audit.
- e. Ensure the public does not interfere with or otherwise disturb the post-election audit.
- f. Ensuring security of ballots and ExpressVote outputs, chain of custody controls, protocols for authorized access, and secure storage of ballots and ExpressVote outputs that will be used in the audit.

Under the direction of the Canvassing Board, a manual or automated independent audit (AIA) is conducted after each election.

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*In the case of a manual audit*, an excel file may be created which contains one spreadsheet that assigns a number to each race on the ballot, and another spreadsheet that lists each precinct. A race is selected through the randomization function of Excel. Based on the race selected, the precincts to be audited are selected through the randomization function of Excel. The randomization function is performed at the Canvassing Board meeting. Alternatively, the Canvassing Board may use identical numbered balls or tags to randomly select a race and precinct(s) to be audited.

The Director of Information Technology provides a report from the Election Management System containing the number of ballots subject to the audit, by precinct and by method of voting (Election Day, Vote By Mail, Early Vote and Provisional). Ballots are stored in areas surveilled by CCTV and with swipe card access in the warehouse according to method of voting (e.g. Early Vote, Vote by Mail, Election Day). All ballots subject to the manual audit are gathered by staff under the direction of the Director of Information Technology and delivered to the tabulation room which is surveilled by CCTV and has limited swipe card access. The ballots are kept separated by precinct and method of voting in the tabulation room until such time as the public audit is to commence.

For the manual audit, the ballots are delivered to the room in which the Canvassing Board will meet, and teams of two manually count the ballots. Members of the public may be present, and the Canvassing Board maintains order. The teams complete the counts and fill

out the appropriate paperwork. Once all teams are finished, the documentation is presented to the Canvassing Board for review and acceptance. Upon completion of the manual audit, the ballots are returned for storage to the warehouse.

Post-election manual audits are conducted in the Elections Service Center training room which is large enough to accommodate the Canvassing Board, SOE staff, and public observers.

A member of the Canvassing Board is present during any times in which ballots are transported out of the locked storage areas and when ballots are removed from their sealed storage containers.

From the time the audit is started until the time the audit is completed the ballots are under the supervision of the Canvassing Board.

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*For an Automated Independent Audit*, and in keeping with Florida Statute, the HCSOE may utilize the state certified Clear Audit system to conduct post-election audits and any (if certified by the state) required recounts. As specifically addressed in statute and rule, staff will scan ballots into the recount/audit tabulation system periodically throughout the election in advance of conducting post-election audits or the calling of any recounts. All scanning into the recount/audit tabulation system will take place during publicly noticed and accessible sessions.

To facilitate observation, each session during which scanning will take place will be posted in the Canvassing Board meeting notice and calendar. This information includes canvassing board meetings and ballot processing sessions, as well as timeframes for scanning

ballots into the recount/audit tabulation system, audit review, and potential meetings to conduct any recounts should they be needed.

In advance of an AIA, each scanner to be used is tested to assure proper operation, and a Logic and Accuracy Test is conducted. The Canvassing board randomly selects the race(s) and precincts(s) to be audited, or the Canvassing Board may direct a 100% audit of all races and precincts. The AIA system shall produce and print the tally for all races from the selected precincts of ballots cast by ballot type. After the AIA system tally is finalized and compiled, the Board shall compare the results to the official vote totals for all races in the selected precincts. The results of the AIA are produced as a summary report listing the number of ballot and vote discrepancies computed at the lowest level of aggregation reported in the election.

If there is a discrepancy of less than  $\frac{1}{2}$  of 1%, the Board shall record the result on the Voting System Post-Election Audit Report. If the discrepancy is  $\frac{1}{2}$  of 1% or more, the Board investigates by reviewing the ballot

images or extracts therefrom to ascertain if the vote was marked in a race that likely was not read by the voting system tabulator or AIA system. The Board prepares a Discrepancy Report for Automated Independent Audit, or the AIA system may print a report with the same required information. The Board also explains the discrepancy on the Voting System Post-Election Audit Report.

Municipal elections are not conducted under the authority of the Canvassing Board.

The location of the audit is posted along with the notice of the audit. Supervisor of Elections employees deliver ballots for the randomly drawn precincts from the secure storage area to the audit area. Canvassing Board members, Supervisor of Elections employees, and/or audit team members may handle or touch ballots. Florida law prohibits all others from handling ballots. Should the audit recess for any reason, ballots are secured.

## Ballot and election materials security – post election

- a. Ballot accountability, storage, and security measures of ballots and election materials until they are destroyed.
- b. Individuals who have authorized access, and who have authority to permit access to stored election materials.

All voted precinct ballots that were cast on Election Day or at an Early Voting location are secured in a locked, access-controlled area with video surveillance until after the contest of election period. These ballots are then stored in the records retention room of the access-controlled warehouse for twenty-two months.

All voted VBM and provisional ballots that have been processed on the DS850 central count scanners are stored in ballot storage boxes. These ballot storage boxes are stored in a VBM cage with access control and video surveillance until after the contest of election period. These ballots are then stored in the records


retention room of the access-controlled warehouse for twenty-two months.

All provisional and VBM ballots rejected by the Canvassing Board are stored in the records retention room of the access-controlled warehouse for twenty-two months.


Election materials are retained as per records retention requirements in the ESC Warehouse and/or records retention room. The Director of Operations and Support Services retains custody of the materials and controls access of staff to the secured areas.

## Appendices


### Chain of Custody: Election Day Media and Voting Equipment




## Chain of Custody: Early Voting Ballots



## Chain of Custody: Election Day Ballots



# Chain of Custody: Vote By Mail Ballots



## Election Schedule

Attached is a template for a standard election cycle schedule. This schedule is updated, adjusted and re-issued annually.













July Dates to Remember Activity	Legal Reference/Description	Due Date
UOCAVA Mailing Deadline	§ 101.62, F.S. No fewer than 45 days before the election	9-July
DOE to submit information on compliance with 45-day UOCAVA absentee ballot mail-out for the Primary to Department of Justice	43 days before the Primary Election	11-July
Canvassing board may begin canvassing absentee ballots for the Primary	§ 101.68, F.S. Upon completion of public testing	14-July
First day to conduct L&A test for Primary	§ 101.5612, F.S. No more than 25 days prior to beginning of early voting	14-July
Domestic Civilian VBM Mailing	§ 101.62, F.S. Between 40th and 33rd day before the election	14-July
Last day for SOE to mail notice of time and location of L&A test to county party chairs and candidates who did not receive notice at qualifying	§ 101.5612, F.S. At least 15 days prior to the beginning of early voting, specific day depends on when early voting will begin in the county	24-July
First day a registered voter or poll watcher may file a challenge to another voter in the same county for the Primary	§ 101.111, F.S. No sooner than 30 days before an election	24-July
Last day to designate EV sites	§ 101.657, F.S. No later than the 30th day prior to the election	24-July
Poll watcher designations due for Early Voting	§ 101.131, F.S. Before noon at least 14 days before early voting begins	25-July
Book Closing	§ 97.055, F.S. On the 29th day before each election	25-July
SOE to certify address and eligibility list maintenance activities	§§ 98.065 and 98.075, F.S. No later than July 31 of each year	31-July

August Dates to Remember Activity	Legal Reference/Description	Due Date
Last day to appoint poll workers	§ 102.012, F.S. At least 20 days prior to any election	3-Aug
Early Voting Begins	§ 101.657, F.S. EV may begin on the 15th day before an election	8-Aug
Poll watcher designations due	§ 101.131, F.S. Noon of the 2nd Tues preceding the election	9-Aug
First day to prepare daily electronic files of EV summary and EV details and upload to the DOS	§ 101.657, F.S. and Rule 1S-2.043, F.A.C. No later than noon of each day for the previous day's activities	9-Aug
Poll watcher designations due for Election Day	§ 101.131, F.S. Noon of the 2nd Tues preceding the election	9-Aug
Last day state write-in ballot available to overseas voters	§ 101.6951, F.S. 90 days prior to a general	10-Aug
Last day to post election prep report on website	§ 100.032, F.S. At least 3 months before a general election	10-Aug
Deadline for SOE to receive requests for absentee ballots to be mailed to voters	§ 101.62, F.S. No later than 5 p.m. on the 10th day before the election	13-Aug
First day that a designee can pick-up an absentee ballot on behalf of a voter for the Primary Election	§ 101.62, F.S. Up to 9 days prior to the election	14-Aug
Last day for SOE to mail absentee ballots requested for the Primary Election	§ 101.62, F.S. No later than 8 days before the election	15-Aug
Last day for SOE to mail or email sample ballots	§ 101.20, F.S. At least 7 days prior to any election	16-Aug
Deadline for late registration for specified subcategory of UOCAVA individuals	§97.0555, F.S. and Rule 1S-2.029, F.A.C. 5 p.m. on the Friday before the election	19-Aug
Early Voting Ends	§ 101.657, F.S. EV may end of the 2nd day before an election	21-Aug
Last day to publish sample ballot in newspaper of general circulation in the county	§ 101.20, F.S. Prior to the day of the election	22-Aug
Last day to prepare daily electronic files of EV summary and EV details and upload to the DOS	§ 101.657, F.S. and Rule 1S-2.043, F.A.C. No later than noon of each day for the previous day's activities	22-Aug
Last day for SOE to deliver 'no excuse' absentee ballot to voter or designee to pick up	§ 101.62, F.S.	22-Aug
Deadline to upload into the results of all early voting and absentee ballots that have been canvassed and tabulated by the end of the early voting period	§ 102.141 (4)(a), By 7 p.m. on the day before the election	22-Aug
Deadline for receipt of absentee ballots	§ 101.67, F.S., By 7 p.m. election day	23-Aug
Canvassing board to file preliminary election results must be filed with the DOS, within 30 minutes after polls close and in 45- minute increments thereafter on election night until all results (except provisional ballots) are completely reported	§ 102.141, F.S.	23-Aug
"Emergency excuse" affidavit required for delivery of absentee ballot on Election Day	§ 101.62, F.S.	23-Aug
Election Day	§ 100.061, F.S. On the Tues 11 weeks prior to the general election	23-Aug
Deadline for all polling place returns to be submitted to the county canvassing board	§ 102.141, F.S. On or before 2 a.m. of the day following any election	24-Aug
Deadline to cure VBM and Provisional Ballot signature issues	§§ 101.048, F.S. and 101.68, F.S. No later than 5 p.m. on the 2nd day following the election	25-Aug
Deadline for canvassing boards to file 1st Unofficial Results of the Primary Election with the DOS	§ 102.141, F.S. No later than noon of the 3rd day after a primary election	26-Aug
Deadline for county canvassing board to file 2nd Unofficial Results, if recount conducted	§ 102.141, F.S. No later than 3 p.m. of the 5th day after a primary election	28-Aug
County canvassing boards to begin publicly noticed audit of the voting system for the Primary Election	§ 101.591, F.S. Immediately following certification of the election by the canvassing board	30-Aug
County canvassing boards to submit 'Conduct of Elections' report on Primary Election to the DOE	§ 102.141, F.S., At the same time that the results of an election are certified	30-Aug
Deadline for county canvassing boards to submit Official Results to the DOS for the Primary Election	§ 102.112, F.S. 5 p.m. on the 7th day following a primary	30-Aug

September Dates to Remember Activity	Legal Reference/Description	Due Date
Elections Canvassing Commission meets to certify Official Results for federal, state, and multicounty office	§ 102.111, F.S. 9 a.m. on the 9th day after a primary election	1-Sept
Deadline for completion of the voting system audit and for the results to be made public	§ 101.591, F.S. and Rule 1S-5.026, F.A.C. No later than 11:59 p.m. on the 7th day following certification of the election by the county canvassing board	6-Sept
Any revisions to security procedures due to DOS	§ 101.015, F.S. At least 45 days before early voting begins.	9-Sept
Report of voting system audit due to DOE	§ 101.591, F.S. and Rule 1S-5.026, F.A.C. Within 15 days after completion of the audit	21-Sept
Last day by when SOE must make information about provisional ballot available to individual voters on free access system for the Primary Election	§ 101.048, F.S. No later than 30 days following the election	22-Sept
UOCAVA Mailing Deadline	§ 101.62, F.S. No fewer than 45 days before the election.	24-Sept
DOE to submit information on compliance with 45-day UOCAVA absentee ballot mail-out for the General Election to Department of Justice	43 days before General Election	26-Sept
Canvassing board may begin canvassing absentee ballots for the General Election	§ 101.68, F.S. Upon completion of testing	29-Sept
First day to conduct logic and accuracy test for General Election	§ 101.5612, F.S. No more than 25 days prior to beginning of early voting	29-Sept
Domestic Civilian VBM Mailing	§ 101.62, F.S. Between 40th and 33rd day before the election.	29-Sept

October Dates to Remember Activity	Legal Reference/Description	Due Date
Deadline for SOE to update voting history for Primary Election	§ 98.0981, F.S. Within 30 days after certification of election by Elections Canvassing Commission results for primary election	1-Oct
Deadline for SOE to file precinct level results of the Primary Election and a reconciliation of voter history and precinct level results with the DOE	§ 98.0981, F.S. Within 30 days after certification of election results by Elections Canvassing Commission for primary election	1-Oct
Last day for SOE to mail notice of time and location of logic and accuracy (L&A) test to county party chairs and candidates who did not receive notice at qualifying	§ 101.5612, F.S. At least 15 days prior to the beginning of early voting	9-Oct
Last day for SOE to designate early voting sites for the General Election and to provide the DOE with addresses and hours for early voting sites	§ 101.657, F.S. No later than the 30th day prior to the election	9-Oct
First day a registered voter or poll watcher may file a challenge to another voter in the same county for the General Election	§ 101.111, F.S. No sooner than 30 days before an election	9-Oct
Last day to designate EV sites	§ 101.657, F.S. No later than the 30th day prior to the election.	9-Oct
Deadline to submit poll watcher designations for early voting sites for General Election	§ 101.131, F.S. Before noon at least 14 days before early voting begins	10-Oct
Book Closing	§ 97.055, F.S. On the 29th day before each election.	11-Oct
Last day to appoint poll workers	§ 102.012, F.S. At least 20 days prior to any election	19-Oct
Early Voting Begins	§ 101.657, F.S. Early voting may begin on the 15th day before an election.	24-Oct
First day for SOE to prepare daily electronic files of early voting summary and early voting details and upload to the DOS	§ 101.657, F.S. and Rule 1S-2.043, F.A.C. No later than noon of each day for the previous day's activities	25-Oct
Poll watcher designations due for Election Day	§ 101.131, F.S. Prior to noon of the 2nd Tues preceding the election.	25-Oct
Deadline for SOE to receive requests for absentee ballots to be mailed to voters for the General	§ 101.62, F.S. No later than 5 p.m. on the 10th day before the election	29-Oct
First day to provide absentee ballots to designees for the General Election	§ 101.62, F.S. Up to 9 days prior to the election	30-Oct
Last day for SOE to mail absentee ballots for the General Election	§ 101.62, F.S. No later than 8 days before the election	31-Oct

<b>November Dates to Remember Activity</b>	<b>Legal Reference/Description</b>	<b>Due Date</b>
Last day to mail or email sample ballots	§ 101.20, F.S. At least 7 days prior to any election	1-Nov
Deadline for late registration for specified subcategory of UOCAVA individuals	§ 97.0555, F.S. and Rule 1S-2.029, F.A.C. 5 p.m. on the Friday before the election	4-Nov
Early Voting Ends	§ 101.657, F.S. EV may end of the 2nd day before an election.	6-Nov
Last day for SOE to publish sample ballot in newspaper of general circulation in the county for the General Election	§ 101.20, F.S. Prior to the day of the election	7-Nov
Last day for SOE to prepare and upload daily electronic files of early voting summary and early voting details to the DOS	§ 101.657, F.S. and Rule 1S-2.043, F.A.C. No later than noon of each day for the previous day's activities	7-Nov
Last day for SOE to deliver 'no excuse' absentee ballot to voter or designee	§ 101.62, F.S.	7-Nov
Deadline for SOE to upload into county election management system the results of all early voting and absentee ballots that have been canvassed and tabulated by the end of the early voting period	§ 102.141 (4)(a), By 7 p.m. on the day before the election	7-Nov
County canvassing board to file preliminary election results must be filed with the DOS, beginning within 30 minutes after polls close and in 45-minute increments thereafter until all results (except provisional ballots) are completely reported	§ 102.141, F.S.	8-Nov
"Emergency excuse" affidavit required for delivery of absentee ballot on Election Day	§ 101.62, F.S.	8-Nov
Election Day	§ 100.031, F.S. On the 1st Tues after the 1st Mon in November of each even numbered year	8-Nov
Deadline for all polling place returns to be submitted to the county canvassing board	§ 102.141, F.S. On or before 2 a.m. of the day following any election	9-Nov
Deadline to cure VBM and Provisional Signature Issues	§§ 101.68, F.S. and 101.048, F.S. No later than 5 p.m. on the 2nd day following the election	10-Nov
Deadline for county canvassing boards to file 1st Unofficial Results of General Election with the DOS	§ 102.141, F.S. No later than noon of the 4th day after a general election	12-Nov
Deadline for canvassing board to file 2nd Unofficial Results with DOS, if recount was conducted	§ 102.141, F.S. No later than 3 p.m. of the 9th day after the election	17-Nov
Deadline for receipt of overseas ballots for General Election	§ 101.6952(5), F.S. Ballot must be postmarked or signed and dated no later than the day of the election	18-Nov
SOE to transmit to DOS a list containing names of all county and district officers elected, office for which each was elected, and the mailing address of each	§ 102.151, F.S. Immediately after the county canvassing board has canvassed the returns of the election	20-Nov
County canvassing boards to begin publicly noticed audit of the voting system for the General Election	§ 101.591, F.S. and Rule 1S-5.026, F.A.C. – Immediately following the certification of the election by the county canvassing board	20-Nov
Deadline for county canvassing boards to submit 'Conduct of Elections' report to the DOE on the conduct of the General	§ 102.141, F.S., At the same time that the results of an election are certified	20-Nov
Deadline for county canvassing boards to submit Official Results to the DOS for the General	§ 102.112, F.S. Noon on the 12th day following the election	20-Nov
Election Canvassing Commission to certify 'Official Results' for federal, state, and multicounty office	§ 102.111, F.S. 9 a.m. on the 14th day after a General	22-Nov
Last day to prepare and upload daily electronic files of absentee ballot request information to DOS	§ 101.62, F.S. and Rule 1S-2.043, F.A.C. 60 days prior to the primary on a daily basis by 8 a.m. until 15 days after the general	23-Nov
Deadline for canvassing board to complete the voting system audit and for the results to be made public	§ 101.591, F.S. and Rule 1S-5.026, F.A.C. No later than 11:59 p.m. on the 7th day following certification of the election by the canvassing board	27-Nov

December Dates to Remember Activity	Legal Reference/Description	Due Date
Deadline for SOE of each county to submit total number of petition signatures verified at no charge for candidate or organization to seek reimbursement from CFO	§ 99.097, F.S. No later than December 1 of the general election year	1-Dec
Last day by when SOE must make information about provisional ballot available to individual voters on free access system for the General	§ 101.048, F.S. No later than 30 days following the election	8-Dec
Last day for SOE to submit reports on post-election certification voting system audit to DOE	§ 101.591, F.S. Within 15 days after completion of the audit	12-Dec
Deadline for SOE to submit reports on voter education programs to the DOS	§ 98.255, F.S. By December 15 of each General Election year	15-Dec
Deadline for SOE to submit reports on the total number of overvotes and undervotes in the “President and Vice President” race to the DOS	§ 101.595, F.S. No later than December 15 of each general election year	15-Dec
Deadline for SOE to update voting history for General	§ 98.0981, F.S. and Rule 1S-2.043, F.A.C. Within 30 days after certification of election results by Elections Canvassing Commission for general	22-Dec
Deadline for SOE to file precinct level results of the General Election and a reconciliation of voter history and precinct level results with the DOE	§ 98.0981, F.S. Within 30 days after certification of election results by Elections Canvassing Commission for primary	22-Dec
Election administrators to review records against Records Retention Schedule for Election Records (GS-3) and internal office retention schedule and identify and schedule disposition of records that have met retention.	Florida Public Records Law.	31-Dec
Deadline to submit to the DOS HAVA Funds Expenditure Reports	Help America Vote Act (HAVA) (52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145).	31-Dec
Deadline to remove post-election all designated inactive voters who have not voted or attempted to vote, requested a vote-by-mail ballot, or updated their voter registration record in two general elections since they were first made inactive.	§98.065(4)(c), F.S.; Rule 1S-2.041(2), F.A.C.; and 52 U.S.C. §2057 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). - No later than Dec 31 in the same year of the second federal election.	31-Dec
All login accounts for access to statewide vote-by-mail ballot request information automatically expire.	Rule 1S-2.043, F.A.C. - At the end of each general election year.	31-Dec